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INTRODUCTION 
In one of its most-watched recent cases, the United States Supreme 
Court struck down a class action alleging that Wal-Mart stores 
discriminated against female employees in pay and promotion decisions.
1
 
The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart’s corporate culture and highly 
discretionary decision-making practices led to sex discrimination on a 
company-wide basis, and they sought injunctive relief as well as backpay 
for individual employees. Reversing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, the Supreme Court held in Wal-Mart v. Dukes that the proposed 
class failed to meet the requirements for class action certification under 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
 Although the decision 
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 1. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 2. More specifically, a majority of the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the 
Rule 23(a)(2) requirement of showing that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class” 
because they had not identified a companywide discriminatory policy. Id. at 2556. The four dissenters 
would have upheld the district court’s determination that the proposed class met the commonality 
requirement, finding a common dispute as to whether Wal-Mart’s discretionary pay and promotion 
policies produced discriminatory outcomes. Id. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). All nine justices 
unanimously agreed that because the plaintiffs sought individual monetary relief in addition to class-
wide injunctive relief, the class should not have been certified under Rule 23(b)(2); cases in which the 
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was widely understood as raising the bar for all types of class actions, it 
had particular significance for employment discrimination litigation. 
Observers wondered if it signaled the end of large-scale employment 
litigation aimed at structural reform of the workplace, or an implicit 
rejection of more expansive theories of employer liability under Title VII.
3
  
While class litigation has continued in the wake of Wal-Mart, the 
opinion clearly has made it more difficult to obtain certification of private 
employment discrimination class actions.
4
 As a result, the role of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in seeking 
structural reform of the workplace has gained comparative importance. 
Unlike private litigants, the EEOC need not comply with the requirements 
of Rule 23 when it brings suit on behalf of a group of aggrieved 
individuals.
5
 Instead, the EEOC possesses express statutory authority to 
sue in its own name to vindicate the public interest in preventing 
employment discrimination and to seek relief for a group of employees.
6
 
The EEOC’s reports have stressed its “unique role and responsibility in 
combating systemic discrimination” and emphasized the importance of 
 
 
monetary relief is not incidental to injunctive or declaratory relief should proceed as 23(b)(3) class 
actions, if at all. Id. at 2561; id. at 2558 (majority opinion). 
 3. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395 (2011) [hereinafter Green, Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law]; 
Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 455 (2011) 
[hereinafter Hart, Civil Rights]; John M. Husband & Bradford J. Williams, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Redux: 
The Future of the Sprawling Class Action, 40 COLO. LAW. 53 (2011); Suzette M. Malveaux, How 
Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34 
(2011); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477 (2011); Noah D. Zatz, Introduction: Working Group on the Future 
of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 387 (2011) [hereinafter Zatz, 
Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment]; Sherry E. Clegg, Note, Employment Discrimination Class 
Actions: Why Plaintiffs Must Cover All Their Bases After the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1087 (2012). 
 4. Although a number of proposed class actions have failed to be certified following Wal-Mart, 
see, e.g., Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2013) (denying certification of proposed 
nationwide sex discrimination class action); Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 08-6292 
(RBK/AMD), 2011 WL 6256978 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2011); (denying class certification); Stockwell v. 
City and Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C 08-5180 PJH, 2011 WL 4803505 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011) 
(same), in other cases, courts have granted certification where the facts were distinguishable from Wal-
Mart. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 
2012) (certifying class action in race discrimination case); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co, 877 
F. Supp.2d 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting class certification); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 
F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (certifying class action).  
 5. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 323 (1980). 
 6. See id. at 331. 
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these cases to its mission.
7
 The agency has other advantages in pursuing 
multi-employee cases: its public funding allows it to pursue cases in which 
monetary damages are low or difficult to prove, and its history, regulatory 
role, and nationwide reach give it resources unavailable to private counsel. 
In the wake of Wal-Mart, observers anticipate that the agency will or 
should play a larger role in bringing systemic cases in the future.
8
 And the 
EEOC has recently recommitted to strengthening its focus on such cases.
9
 
Given the obstacles to private class actions created by Wal-Mart and the 
EEOC’s unique powers to enforce Title VII, the agency’s efforts to seek 
structural reform of workplaces warrant close study. Yet, the recent 
literature has largely overlooked the role of the EEOC in pursuing 
structural reform in the workplace.  
Early theories of “structural reform” or “public law litigation”—cases 
that try “to give meaning to [legal] values in the operation of large-scale 
organizations”10—developed in the years after Title VII was passed, and 
emphasized dramatic legal struggles to transform recalcitrant institutions.
11
 
Although many of the examples cited involved suits against public entities 
such as hospitals, prisons, jails, and schools, a number of scholars 
concurred that large-scale employment discrimination cases fit the public 
law litigation model.
12
 Scholars like Owen Fiss and
 
Abram Chayes, along 
 
 
 7. EEOC, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT 2 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
task_reports/upload/systemic.pdf [hereinafter EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT].  
 8. See, e.g., Lydell C. Bridgeford, EEOC’s Systemic Program Set to Fill Gap in Private Class 
Actions, Attorneys Predict, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 244, Dec. 19, 2012, at A-5; Zatz, Future of 
Systemic Disparate Treatment, supra note 3, at 394 (anticipating the EEOC and Department of Justice 
might bring next wave of systemic disparate treatment cases). See also Hart, Civil Rights, supra note 3, 
at 475 (suggesting a greater reliance on EEOC enforcement efforts to address systemic discrimination 
after Wal-Mart); Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pattern or Practice after Wal-Mart: The EEOC 
as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87 (2013) (arguing for the EEOC to take on a greater role in pursuing 
pattern or practice cases after Dukes). 
 9. See EEOC, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2016, available at http://www.eeoc. 
gov/eeoc/plan/upload/strategic_plan_12to16.pdf; EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT, supra note 7. 
 10. Owen Fiss, Foreword, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, 
Forms of Justice]; see also OWEN FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 86–95 (1978) [hereinafter FISS, 
CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION]. As Fiss explained, “[s]tructural reform is premised on the notion that the 
quality of our social life is affected in important ways by the operation of large-scale organizations, not 
just by individuals acting either beyond or within these organizations.” Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra, 
at 2. 
 11. See generally, e.g., Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 10, at 27–28; Abram Chayes, The Role 
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1298–1302 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, 
Public Law Litigation].  
 12. See, e.g., Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 919 (1978) (asserting that Title VII class 
actions have the characteristics of public law litigation); Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 11, 
at 1284 (listing employment discrimination cases as one of the “avatars” of public law litigation); 
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with a crowd of other observers,
13
 depicted mammoth cases that provide 
the occasion for heroic (or imperial
14
) judging or advocacy. Of central 
importance to these cases was the remedial phase, “a long continuous 
relationship between the judge and the institution.”15 As Chayes argued, 
the decree in public law cases typically “provid[ed] for a complex, on-
going regime of performance [that] prolongs and deepens, rather than 
terminates, the court’s involvement with the dispute.”16 Thus, the literature 
described cases that lasted for years, even decades, and cost millions of 
dollars to litigate, that posed acute challenges to the managerial capacity of 
courts and offer occasions for power grabs by plaintiffs. Both those who 
have praised and those who have condemned structural reform litigation 
have concurred in this general description, which we call the “gladiator 
theory” of structural reform litigation. 
In subsequent years, theorists of structural reform litigation began to 
explore more collaborative models of reform. Charles Sabel and William 
Simon wrote in 2004 that the litigation has moved away from remedial 
intervention modeled on command-and-control bureaucracy “toward a 
kind of intervention that can be called ‘experimentalist,’” which 
“emphasizes ongoing stakeholder negotiation, continuously revised 
performance measures, and transparency.”17 Other scholars have seen a 
similar approach in the workplace context, describing what they term a 
“structural approach” to solving problems of discriminatory bias.18 They 
 
 
Maimon Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of 
Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 893 [hereinafter Schwarzchild, Public Law by 
Private Bargain] (asserting that “Title VII litigation [is] a formidable example of ‘public law’”). 
 13. For an extensive guide to the literature, see Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over 
Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 569 n.71 (2006) 
[hereinafter Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time]; Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero 
Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1995–97 & nn.10–15 
(1999).  
 14. See, e.g., Nathan Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 PUB. INT. 104 (1975). 
 15. Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 10, at 27.  
 16. Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 11, at 1298. 
 17. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1016 (2004) (abstract) [hereinafter Sabel & Simon, 
Destabilization Rights]. 
 18. See generally Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) [hereinafter Sturm, Second Generation]; Tristin K. Green, 
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003) [hereinafter Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics]. In 
their view, the “easy” first generation cases of blatant discrimination are largely gone; discriminatory 
bias in employment today is more subtle and difficult to detect, yet the structure of the contemporary 
workplace renders it nonetheless extremely potent. Sturm, Second Generation, at 468–74; Green, 
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, at 95–108. Effective workplace reform efforts therefore 
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point to some high profile cases as embodying this approach—relying on 
flexible, context-specific remedies to create “processes of accountability” 
and encourage experimentation and information-sharing.
19
 We refer to this 
vision of civil rights injunctive litigation as the “collaboration theory.” 
The collaboration theory has in turn come under criticism, as unduly 
empowering employers and human resources professionals to devise 
compliance strategies.
20
 Because the requirements of the anti-
discrimination norm are ambiguous, employers can influence how those 
norms are operationalized, and their practices in turn shape the meaning of 
those norms. Law, in other words, is endogenous to its own 
implementation.
21
 Organizational sociologists like Lauren Edelman, Frank 
Dobbin, and others have found that employers frequently respond to the 
requirements of anti-discrimination laws in ways that signal compliance 
with the law while accommodating the organization’s managerial 
interests.
22
 Managers have come to embrace the advice of personnel 
professionals who have long advocated a set of standardized bureaucratic 
responses, such as creating anti-discrimination policies, conducting EEO 
trainings, and establishing grievance procedures. These responses diffused 
through professional networks and were eventually validated by court 
decisions endorsing them as liability-defeating compliance.  
The literature just summarized describing structural reform of the 
workplace suffers from several limitations. First, to the extent that it 
describes systemic litigation, it has relied on a handful of mega cases that 
are not necessarily representative.
23
 In the 1970s, a prime example was the 
 
 
require not battles, but collaborations. Sturm, Second Generation, at 475–78; Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics, at 144. 
 19. Susan Sturm, Equality and the Forms of Justice, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 80 (2003); Sturm, 
Second Generation, supra note 18, at 542. 
 20. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 25–34 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Structural Turn]; Tristin K. Green, 
Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659 
705–06 (2003) [hereinafter Green, Targeting Workplace Context]. 
 21. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen, & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity 
of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 406, 409 (1999) 
[hereinafter Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation]. 
 22. See, e.g., FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 220–33 (2009); Lauren B. 
Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller, & Iona Mara-Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of 
Law, 106 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 1589, 1592 (2001) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric]; 
Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil 
Rights Law, 97 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 1531, 1542 (1992) [hereinafter Edelman, Legal Ambiguity]. 
 23. Similarly, in discussing prison and jail injunctive litigation, one of us has written that “our 
knowledge about a few cases is deep but highly unreliable more generally because those few are so 
aberrational.” Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time, supra note 13, at 571. 
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litigation against AT&T.
24
 More recently, analysis has featured suits 
against Shoney’s,25 Home Depot,26 Wal-Mart,27 Coca-Cola,28 and 
Texaco.
29
 Observers disagree on how to interpret these high-profile 
cases,
30
 but perhaps the greater problem lies in taking them as 
representative of broader trends. These cases constitute just a sliver of a 
larger docket of cases aimed at providing relief to a group or class of 
employees
31—cases that have gone largely unexamined. Second, the 
 
 
 24. EEOC v. AT&T, 365 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (documents and information available at 
UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., THE CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE [hereinafter CIVIL 
RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE], http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11146). See, e.g., 
HERBERT R. NORTHRUP & JOHN A. LARSON, THE IMPACT OF THE AT&T-EEO CONSENT DECREE 
(1979); MARJORIE A. STOCKFORD, THE BELLWOMEN: THE STORY OF THE LANDMARK AT&T SEX 
DISCRIMINATION CASE (2004). 
 25. Haynes v. Shoney’s, No. 3:89-cv-30093, 1993 WL 19915 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 1993) 
(documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10711). See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and 
the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367 (2008) [hereinafter Levit, Megacases]. 
 26. Butler v. Home Depot, No. 3:94-cv-04335 (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 19, 1994) (documents and 
information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/ 
detail.php?id=9471). See, e.g., Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18; Levit, Megacases, supra 
note 25; Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment 
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003) [hereinafter Selmi, Price of 
Discrimination]; Lynn Perry Wooten & Erika Hayes James, When Firms Fail to Learn: The 
Perpetuation of Discrimination in the Workplace, 13 MGMT. INQUIRY 23 (2004).  
 27. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (documents and information available at CIVIL 
RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10697). See, e.g., 
LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR WORKERS’ RIGHTS AT 
WAL-MART (2004).  
 28. Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (documents and information 
available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail. 
php?id=9473). See, e.g., Levit, Megacases, supra note 25; Henry Unger, Discrimination Lawsuit 
Coca-Cola Accused of “Company-wide Pattern,” ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 24, 1999, at H1. 
 29. Roberts v. Texaco, Inc., 979 F.Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (for documents and information, 
see CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 8162). 
See, e.g., CATHY CRONIN-HARRIS & DAVID M. WHITE, NEGOTIATING ENDURING CORPORATE 
CHANGE: A CASE STUDY ON THE TASK FORCE ON EQUALITY AND FAIRNESS IN ROBERTS V. TEXACO 
INC. (2005), available at http://www.dmwlawfirm.com/resources/Texaco%20Case% 20Study.pdf; 
Levit, Megacases, supra note 25; Selmi, Price of Discriminaton, supra note 26. 
 30. Selmi and Sturm disagree, for example, on nearly everything important about the Home 
Depot case. Compare Selmi, Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1281–89 (characterizing Home 
Depot’s response to class litigation as an example of recalcitrance), with Sturm, Second Generation, 
supra note 18, at 509–19 (describing consent decree reached in Home Depot litigation as an innovative 
solution). 
 31. Employment discrimination suits were and remain one of the largest components of federal 
court civil litigation. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2006, 2006 tbl. C-2A (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2006/appendices/c2a.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2012, 2012 TBL. C-2A (2012), available at http://www. 
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almost exclusive focus of the recent literature has been on cases brought 
by private counsel, with little or no attention paid to the enforcement 
efforts of the EEOC or the role that might be played by the agency in 
seeking structural reforms.
32
 Finally, the sociological literature, while 
attentive to firms’ responses to the general legal environment, has largely 
neglected the role of the EEOC in that process in recent years. 
In this Article, we begin to fill these gaps by systematically analyzing 
the EEOC’s litigation activities and the injunctive relief it obtained in 
cases brought over a ten-year period, from fiscal years 1997 to 2006.
33
 Our 
focus is on the most “class-like” of the EEOC’s cases—those most likely 
aiming at structural reform of the workplace—which we examine in light 
of the existing literature. We find that neither the early description of 
public law litigation, the gladiator theory, nor more recent, experimentalist 
accounts of institutional reform, the collaboration theory, depicts the 
reality of the EEOC’s practices in systemic cases. Unlike the depiction of 
structural reform litigation in the gladiator theory, the EEOC’s litigation is 
fairly modest; the cases are not bet-the-company battles and the awards are 
for thousands or occasionally millions of dollars, but not tens or hundreds 
of millions. The remedial phases last several years, not decades, and the 
dockets show few signs of post-decretal struggle. The cases are, it seems, 
only occasionally highly contentious; few epic battles appear. Most often 
no heated contestation of anti-discrimination norms takes place; the cases 
nearly always end with settlements rather than litigated judgments, and 
most of those settlements are negotiated without significant judicial 
intervention. Nor do the decrees require wholesale change to company 
practices, but rather more modest changes—in particular, the 
rationalization of hiring, promotion, and complaint investigation 
processes. In short, these are ordinary, moderate-size litigations, not 
dramatic struggles.  
At the same time, there is little sign of the type of flexible, 
contextualized, and decentralized problem-solving processes that the 
collaboration theorists envision. The EEOC’s decrees are not obviously 
individualized or contextual; most of their terms recur across cases. 
 
 
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C02ASep12.pdf. The vast majority 
of employment discrimination suits are brought by private counsel. 
 32. For example, Susan Sturm and Michael Selmi make only brief mention of the EEOC in their 
studies of large-scale employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Selmi, Price of Discrimination, 
supra note 26, at 1330–31; Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 550–53. 
 33. For the EEOC, as for the federal government as a whole, a fiscal year begins on October 1 of 
the previous year and runs through September 30 of the year which it is numbered. 
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Moreover, only rarely do the decrees appear to require actions that are 
significantly integrated with an employer’s core operations. It is, of 
course, possible that the terms of these consent decrees do not capture the 
collaborative nature of the problem solving they frame. By definition, a 
collaborative approach to structural reform will not entail clearly 
articulated rules or goals. Rather, one might look for evidence that a 
decree sets up a process that encourages and facilitates creative, 
accountable, and effective problem solving. Our data, however, contain 
little such evidence. The EEOC’s consent decrees generally repeat the 
same handful of requirements regarding matters like notice posting, 
training, and complaint processing. While a significant minority of the 
decrees empower specified actors—human resources managers or 
consultants—to report to management and oversee implementation, very 
few decrees appear to put into place any mechanisms to create benchmarks 
by which employers might be held accountable or to encourage ongoing 
dialogue and norm creation with interested stakeholders. And virtually 
none of the consent decrees we examined appear to give ordinary 
employees any meaningful voice in the process of articulating and 
implementing anti-discrimination norms apart from the ability to file 
individual complaints.  
If the gladiator and collaboration theories do not accurately describe 
the EEOC’s injunctive litigation, how best can it be understood? Even in 
those cases we identify as systemic, the remedies obtained by the EEOC 
are geared more towards rationalizing the firm’s employment practices 
than transforming its culture and norms. They impose practices that would 
be entirely familiar to firms with well-functioning human resources 
departments that have adopted professionally endorsed “best practices” for 
compliance with the law. The adoption of these forms of injunctive relief 
is consonant with the sociological literature on how firms respond in non-
litigation contexts to anti-discrimination law. Thus, we argue that the 
EEOC’s structural reform efforts are best viewed not as intense battles 
seeking to transform the heart and soul of complex organizations, nor as 
equally intense and equally transformative partnerships, but as the quite 
routinized application of managerialist, bureaucratic responses to the legal 
prohibitions against discrimination.  
Our argument unfolds as follows: We begin in Part I by surveying the 
literature on structural reform litigation and on the organizational 
responses to anti-discrimination law. In Part II, we describe the EEOC’s 
role as a structural reform plaintiff. Part III presents three case studies as 
examples of the EEOC’s systemic litigation, detailing the types of 
injunctive relief obtained. Part IV more systematically explores the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/7
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injunctive relief obtained in the EEOC’s systemic litigation over a ten-year 
period. It describes our methodology, sets out some basic information 
about the agency’s systemic docket, and then examines this evidence in 
light of the theoretical literature.
34
 We conclude that the EEOC’s 
injunctive practices are best understood as pursuing standard, bureaucratic 
personnel practices that have helped to promote and ratify the 
managerialist responses adopted by many organizations. We finish by 
briefly assessing the EEOC’s efforts to address systemic discrimination in 
the Conclusion.  
I. THE PRIOR LITERATURE 
In this Part, we review the literatures regarding structural reform 
litigation and the impact of anti-discrimination norms in the workplace. 
A. The Gladiator Theory 
The early scholarship on the topic magnified the image of structural 
reform litigation, giving the impression that civil rights injunctive cases 
are almost invariably the sites of long- and hard-fought struggles for 
justice. In Against Settlement, in 1984, Owen Fiss described cases in 
which courts “seek to safeguard public values by restructuring large-scale 
bureaucratic organizations” in dramatic terms: “the task is enormous, and 
our knowledge of how to restructure on-going bureaucratic organizations 
is limited. As a consequence, courts must oversee and manage the 
remedial process for a long time—maybe forever.”35 In his view, ongoing 
disputes and judicial involvement were “inevitable,” even in cases that 
settle:  
The parties may be ignorant of the difficulties ahead or optimistic 
about the future, or they may simply believe that they can get more 
favorable terms through a bargained-for agreement. Soon, however, 
the inevitable happens: One party returns to court and asks the judge 
 
 
 34. All data and replication code are posted online. See http://margoschlanger.net; & http://eeoc 
litigation.wustl.edu/. The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse archives relevant case documents and 
other information. See CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, available at http://www.clearing 
house.net/results.php?searchSpecial Collection=1. 
 35. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083 (1984). 
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to modify the decree, either to make it more effective or less 
stringent.
36
  
From this perspective, a key feature of structural reform cases is their 
dramatic quality. These are, for Fiss, cases replete with “confrontations” 
and “threats,” and therefore particularly in need of stalwart judging:  
The judge tries to give meaning to our constitutional values in the 
operation of these organizations. . . . The structural suit is one in 
which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over values of 
constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization 
to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present 
institutional arrangements. The injunction is the means by which 
these reconstructive directives are transmitted.
37
 
Likewise, Colin Diver explained in the context of custodial institution 
litigation that decree development and enforcement are complex and 
contentious processes:  
The decree usually has followed an extended process that began 
with a court order to the defendants to submit a comprehensive plan 
for the eradication of violations and continued through lengthy 
negotiations and revisions. Promulgation of the decree has not 
terminated the litigation but instead simply has initiated a process of 
enforcement extending into the indefinite future. Ordinarily, the 
court has appointed an individual or a committee to monitor the 
defendants’ compliance and to recommend corrective measures, but 
often it must reenter the dispute repeatedly to interpret or to modify 
the original order or to invoke its coercive powers to secure 
compliance.
38
  
This observation of intense judicial involvement—whether as adjudicator, 
manager, or enforcer—is the dominant takeaway of much of the structural 
reform literature. Whatever their precise role, judges’ “time-consuming 
and cumbersome supervision” is said to be characteristic of structural 
reform litigation.
39
  
 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 10, at 2. 
 38. Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in 
Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 52 (1979) (footnote call numbers omitted).  
 39. Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. 
REV. 85, 123 (2007). 
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Even some observers less focused on the role of the judge agree that 
these cases are likely to be extremely drawn out and contentious, 
characterized by endless squabbles over implementation. In a 2007 article, 
John Jeffries and George Rutherglen, for example, highlighted the 
importance of consent decrees rather than litigation in structural reform 
cases, but their description nonetheless emphasizes the conflict in the 
proceedings, which, they observe, “came to resemble a form of supervised 
political bargaining.”40 And Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod have 
criticized public law litigation for the authority it offers plaintiffs’ lawyers 
in countless rounds of post-liability negotiations.
41
 
Discussion of public law litigation sometimes focused on the public 
status of the defendants. But usually, employment discrimination cases 
were considered part and parcel of the phenomenon of structural reform 
litigation. Abram Chayes, for example, described employment 
discrimination cases as one of the “avatars of this new form of 
litigation.”42 Similarly, Maimon Schwarzchild labeled Title VII litigation a 
“formidable example” of public law or structural litigation.43 
Discrimination cases brought against private employers were classified as 
“public” based on their broad impact. As Schwarzchild explained:  
The outcome of a Title VII case may be to restructure an 
employer’s entire process of selecting, hiring, training, assigning, 
promoting, and firing staff. Such a remedy affects not only the 
parties—the plaintiffs and the employer—but also the incumbent 
employees, future applicants, and the economic and moral interests 
of society as a whole.
44
 
Thus, the employment class action, which aimed at reforming an 
employer’s personnel practices to eradicate systemic bias, was viewed as a 
prototypical example of public law litigation in the scholarly literature. 
Because of its emphasis on the dramatic quality of this litigation, 
characterized by intense litigation battles, on-going judicial involvement 
 
 
 40. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
1387, 1409 (2007).  
 41. For examples of a litigant-focused analysis that makes these points, see generally ROSS 
SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN 
GOVERNMENT (2003); Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, From Status to Contract and Back Again: 
Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 115 (2007). 
 42. Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 11, at 1284. 
 43. Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain, supra note 12, at 893. 
 44. Id. 
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and persistent disputing over implementation, we refer to this depiction of 
structural reform litigation in employment as the gladiator theory. 
B. The Collaboration Theory  
Over the past decade, a number of scholars have articulated a new 
vision of institutional reform litigation, representing a distinct break from 
traditional interpretations of public law litigation. For example, Charles 
Sabel and William Simon argue that “[t]he evolution of structural 
remedies in recent decades can be usefully stylized as a shift away from 
command-and-control injunctive regulation toward experimentalist 
intervention.”45 Building on “democratic experimentalist” ideas about 
regulation
46
 they explain:  
[E]xperimentalist regulation combines more flexible and 
provisional norms with procedures for ongoing stakeholder 
participation and measured accountability. . . . [T]he governing 
norms are general standards that express the goals the parties are 
expected to achieve—that is, outputs rather than inputs. Typically, 
the regime leaves the parties with a substantial range of discretion 
as to how to achieve these goals. At the same time, it specifies both 
standards and procedures for the measurement of the institution’s 
performance.
47
  
This vision of public law litigation is less conflict-suffused than the 
gladiator literature cited above. The law still plays a key role—the 
assertion of rights can destabilize the established practices of public 
institutions. However, rather than relying on top-down, fixed-rule 
solutions imposed by a court, that destabilization can “open up” an 
organization to an on-going process of deliberation among parties and 
stakeholders in order to resolve problems organically. “[B]ecause 
experimentalist remedies contemplate a permanent process of ramifying, 
participatory self-revision rather than a one-time readjustment to fixed 
criteria,”48 significant post-decretal engagement by the parties, under the 
supervision of the court, is contemplated. On the other hand, courts are 
 
 
 45. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 17, at 1019. 
 46. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: 
Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002). 
 47. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 17, at 1019. 
 48. Id. at 1020. 
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less involved in the shaping of specific remedies than under the traditional 
vision: “the norms that define compliance at any one moment are the work 
not of the judiciary, but of the actors who live by them.”49  
Building on this vision, some employment law scholars have argued 
for a structural response to employment discrimination. They argue that 
the nature of discriminatory bias in the workplace has changed in form. 
Early litigation efforts focused on eliminating overt forms of race and 
gender subordination in the workplace. Today, although “whites only” 
employment listings and explicit race or gender classifications have 
largely disappeared, significant disparities in employment outcomes 
persist along race and gender lines, the result of more subtle forms of bias 
that block the progress of racial minorities and women in the workplace. 
These forms of “second generation discrimination” are the product of 
workplace structures, rather than “deliberate exclusion or subordination 
based on race or gender.”50 Scholars attribute second-generation 
discrimination to psychological processes, such as unconscious racism or 
implicit cognitive bias,
51
 as well as a firm’s culture and organizational 
structure. Susan Sturm, for example, argues that patterns of interaction 
such as undermining or “freezing out” by colleagues, or exclusion from 
important training and mentoring opportunities can block the progress of 
members of disfavored groups.
52
 Tristin Green similarly argues that 
developments such as the breakdown of internal labor markets, the 
replacement of fixed job ladders with “flattened hierarchies,” the emphasis 
on flexibility and the growth of peer assessments, which diffuse 
responsibility for decision making, make it more difficult to identify 
discrete discriminatory acts.
53
 Importantly, this form of discrimination 
results not from a discrete, individual action, but from “ongoing patterns 
of interaction shaped by organizational culture.”54  
 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 466–68. 
 51. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious 
Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415 (2000).  
 52. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 468–69. 
 53. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 99–104. See generally 
Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for 
Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001). 
 54. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 470. 
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Citing these changes in the nature of discrimination and the 
organization of work, a number of scholars have argued that anti-
discrimination law must change as well. Some have argued for amending 
Title VII’s liability standards.55 Others, more relevant to this project, have 
argued that because bias results from organizational structure, any 
effective remedy must be “structural” as well. Thus, Green argues that a 
“contextualized, multifaceted problem-solving process [is] needed for 
change.”56 Similarly, Sturm calls for a “de-centered, holistic, and dynamic 
approach” to litigation57 that encourages “the development of institutions 
and processes to enact general norms in particular contexts. . . . [and] 
experimentation with respect to information gathering, organizational 
design, incentive structures, measures of effectiveness, and methods of 
institutionalizing accountability . . . .”58  
Similarly observing a shift away from traditional command and control 
regulation, Cynthia Estlund sees the “potential to create new mechanisms 
for the enforcement of employee rights and labor standards.”59 Although 
her focus is on basic labor standards, such as minimum wage and overtime 
requirements and health and safety regulations, Estlund’s analysis 
encompasses the trend toward self-regulation in the enforcement of anti-
discrimination norms as well. In her view, effective self-regulation must 
be “‘tripartite’ in structure”—that is, “[i]t requires the participation of the 
government, the regulated firm, and the workers for whose benefit the 
relevant legal norms exist.”60 Establishing meaningful tripartism has been 
made more difficult, however, by the steep decline in unionization rates. 
Thus, she argues that a crucial element of any effective regime of self-
regulation is “[i]ndependent outside monitoring with direct input from 
employees.”61 Employee participation is essential to the success of self-
regulation because employee representatives can not only help devise and 
 
 
 55. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: 
Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370 (1994); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, 
Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993); Green, Discrimination in Workplace 
Dynamics, supra note 18. 
 56. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 156. 
 57. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 462. 
 58. Id. at 463. 
 59. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 319, 321 (2005) [hereinafter Estlund, Rebuilding the Law]. 
 60. Id. at 323. 
 61. Id. at 356. 
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implement flexible, relevant substantive changes in the workplace, they 
are also in the best position to monitor firm compliance.
62
  
This recent work on experimentalist forms of litigated remedies has 
both descriptive and normative components. As a descriptive matter, it 
asserts that the elements of such an approach are emerging in actual 
practice. Thus, Green points to the terms of several recent settlement 
agreements and consent decrees as exemplars of efforts that address 
structural concerns.
63
 Similarly, Sturm explores three cases studies as 
concrete examples of new types of collaborative efforts to identify and 
address manifestations of workplace bias.
64
  
The normative implications of this work are more ambiguous. Although 
some scholars, particularly Sturm, appear to strongly endorse a 
collaborative problem-solving approach within anti-discrimination 
litigation, others are more ambivalent. Green observes that the complexity 
of structural discrimination and the need for collaborative, flexible 
problem-solving raises the risk that attempts at structural change will 
“trigger symbolic rather than meaningful organizational reform.”65 Estlund 
similarly worries that an emphasis on self-regulation has “the potential to 
divert crucial public resources from the task of securing compliance with 
public norms.”66 Some scholars are outright critical of the collaborative 
approach. Samuel Bagenstos, for example, expresses skepticism that it 
will be successful, in part because it entails deference to “professional 
communities—such as those of human relations professionals and 
lawyers—that are as likely to subvert as to promote norms of workplace 
equality.”67 Much of the uncertainty and skepticism about the 
collaborative approach stem from the findings of organizational 
sociologists, whose work we explore in the next Part.  
 
 
 62. Id. at 358. 
 63. See Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 155. 
 64. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 491.  
 65. Green, Targeting Workplace Context, supra note 20, at 709. See also Green, Future of 
Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, supra note 3, at 449 (“The risk remains . . . that courts and other 
players—including class action lawyers—will defer to employer-initiated compliance efforts or will 
rubber stamp symbolic measures over effective ones.”) 
 66. Estlund, Rebuilding the Law, supra note 59, at 321. 
 67. Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 20, at 3. 
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C. The Managerialism Theory 
In research spanning decades, sociologists Lauren Edelman, Frank 
Dobbin, and others have documented the ways in which the legal ideals of 
civil rights laws are constructed and reconstructed as those prescriptions 
move from the legal domain into organizations. Their work does not focus 
on injunctive remedies per se, but instead on how firms respond to the 
general litigation threat posed by Title VII and other anti-discrimination 
statutes. They explain that when confronted with the legal mandate 
forbidding discrimination, firms sought to develop responses that signaled 
“a visible commitment to the law.”68 At the same time, firms viewed anti-
discrimination mandates as potentially in conflict with managerial 
interests in exercising broad discretion and operating efficiently. When a 
law like Title VII is “ambiguous, procedural in emphasis, and difficult to 
enforce,” it is “especially open to organizational mediation.”69 In other 
words, ambiguity leaves firms greater leeway to “construct the law in a 
manner that is minimally disruptive to the status quo,”70 and as they 
internalize the law, it becomes “infused with managerial values.”71  
The process unfolded over time, with personnel professionals gaining 
influence in defining compliance and courts ratifying those responses. 
Dobbin writes that “[i]t was civil rights activists who fought for equal 
opportunity in employment . . . . [b]ut it was personnel managers who 
defined what job discrimination was and was not. . . . In the absence of 
clear government guidelines, personnel experts modeled compliance 
measures on classical personnel practices.”72 As these measures spread 
among firms, courts in turn begin to defer, taking these common 
organizational practices as evidence of good faith compliance and thereby 
ratifying the rationality of these responses. For example, the notion that 
firms should institute internal EEO grievance procedures to reduce their 
risks of liability is now widely accepted. Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 
recount, however, that this “accepted wisdom” emerged at a time when 
there was little empirical evidence that internal grievance procedures 
either reduced the incidence of external claims or would be accepted as a 
 
 
 68. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity, supra note 22, at 1542. 
 69. Id. at 1536, 1542. 
 70. Id. at 1535. 
 71. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric, supra note 22, at 1592. 
 72. DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 220. 
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legal defense in court.
73
 Nevertheless, accounts of the value of grievance 
procedures were “told and retold”74 so that such procedures came to be 
equated with rational practices, and firms seeking to demonstrate 
compliance with the legal mandate adopted these procedures. Eventually 
the Supreme Court joined the chorus, authoritatively, when it held that 
employers that had grievance procedures could assert an affirmative 
defense against claims of hostile work environment sexual harassment 
under some circumstances.
75
 By endorsing existing practices, the Court 
transformed grievance systems into a rational liability-reduction response. 
In a similar manner, other organizational responses to the anti-
discrimination mandate have become part of a standard bureaucratic set of 
responses to the legal prohibitions against employment discrimination. In 
addition to grievance procedures, firms typically adopt explicit anti-
discrimination policies and often require “sensitivity training” of managers 
or employees; they also include equal employment opportunity 
affirmations in their job advertising, or adopt other kinds of diversity 
programs.
76
 Many scholars are extremely skeptical about the efficacy of 
these measures, dismissing much of the modern diversity toolkit as mere 
window dressing that signals EEO compliance while doing little to 
promote equality or unbiased decision-making in the workplace.
77
 But 
 
 
 73. See Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 21, at 409. 
 74. Id. at 408. 
 75. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998); Burlington Indus. Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
 76. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Erin L. Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional 
Construction of Legal Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1203 (2007) [hereinafter 
Dobbin & Kelly, How to Stop Harassment]; Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin, & Erin Kelly, Best 
Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity 
Policies, 71 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 589 (2006) [hereinafter Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, Best 
Practices]. 
 77. See, e.g., Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 20, at 29 (expressing skepticism that 
responses like dispute resolution procedures and training programs actually result in equal treatment 
and non-discrimination); Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound 
of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4–6 (2001) [hereinafter Bisom-Rapp, Ounce 
of Prevention] (arguing that anti-discrimination training may actually increase bias and undermine 
enforcement of employment discrimination law); Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, 
supra note 21 (finding that EEO grievance procedures represented strategic attempts at rational 
compliance given lack of evidence of their value when initially adopted); Joanna L. Grossman, The 
Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 4–5 (2003) (contending that sexual harassment grievance procedures and 
training programs represent a triumph of form over substance); Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, Best 
Practices, supra note 76, at 610–11 (evaluating efficacy of corporate EEO policies and finding that 
some have little or no effect on increasing diversity in management); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic 
Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003) (arguing that 
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whether they work or not, these sorts of managerialist responses are now 
prevalent. 
The sociological literature on managerialist responses to anti-
discrimination laws and norms focuses on how firms generally interpret 
and adapt to the law, however, not on their response to targeted litigation 
and specific types of injunctions.
78
 In contrast, the traditional literature on 
structural reform highlights the impact of litigated reform efforts, 
suggesting that injunctive orders provoke different responses than the 
mere liability-creating statute and the resulting litigation threat. Selmi’s 
work bridges the gap between these two strands. He argues that while 
earlier public law litigation imposed meaningful remedies like redesigned 
employment tests or preferential hiring for discrimination victims,
79
 in 
more recent class actions, private litigants have been content with 
remedies like EEO training and diversity initiatives—the types of 
responses documented—and frequently criticized—in the managerialism 
literature.  
Selmi is highly critical of the shift: “Not so long ago, class action 
employment discrimination suits were defined as a quintessential form of 
public law litigation where monetary relief was generally viewed as one 
component of necessary remedial relief, and a far less important 
component than the institutional reform the suit ultimately produced.”80 
By contrast, he argues that today “employment discrimination litigation 
has become a private affair that is largely about money and public 
relations, and rarely concerned with implementing broad institutional 
 
 
internal compliance structures like those promoted by employment discrimination doctrine are costly 
and largely ineffective); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: the Ellerth and Faragher 
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 198–99 (2004) (asserting that the affirmative 
defense recognized in Ellerth and Faragher reward employers for developing policies and procedures 
that do not actually deter sexual harassment). 
 78. To the extent that the sociological literature deals with EEO litigation, it is concerned more 
with damage actions and the monetary incentives they create than with injunctive requirements. 
Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in Private Workplaces: The 
Effects of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits Over Time, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 855 (2006); Sheryl 
Skaggs, Producing Change or Bagging Opportunity? The Effects of Discrimination Litigation on 
Women in Supermarket Management, 113 AM. J. SOC. 1148 (2008); Sheryl Skaggs, Legal-Political 
Pressures and African American Access to Managerial Jobs, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 225 (2009). There are, 
however, a few sociology papers that examine the impact of injunctions on workplace diversity. See 
Elizabeth Hirsh & Youngjoo Cha, For Law and Markets? Employment Discrimination Law Suits, 
Market Performance, and Managerial Diversity (Working Paper), available at http://faculty.chicago 
booth.edu/workshops/orgs-markets/pdf/HirshMarketsWin2014.pdf; Wooten & James, supra note 26.  
 79. Selmi, Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1298–99. 
 80. Id. at 1251.  
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reform.”81 Even when a prospective consent decree is entered, courts have 
little involvement in shaping the terms of those decrees; instead, they are 
negotiated between private parties who agree to actions—training 
programs or diversity initiatives, for example—that are predictably 
ineffective in combating discrimination and serve the corporation’s 
interests, rather than fundamentally altering its crucial personnel 
practices.
82
 Although he does not use the same terminology, Selmi is 
essentially complaining that the private EEO class action has embraced 
managerialist responses, rather than more reformist remedies, abandoning 
meaningful measures to benefit victims and prevent future discrimination.  
Selmi’s argument rests in part on the changed incentives for the private 
bar following passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which increased the 
availability of money damages.
83
 His focus is therefore on the private class 
action, and he does not claim that his portrait of private remedies describes 
the EEOC’s litigation practice. Indeed, Selmi acknowledges differences 
between private lawyers and the EEOC.
84
 One might expect that the 
EEOC, as a publicly funded agency, is less likely to be driven by monetary 
concerns. In fact, the agency has self-consciously adopted a stance 
differentiating itself from private litigants, claiming to target systemic 
discrimination for reform and to assist complainants based on the merits, 
not the monetary value, of their claims.
85
 Nevertheless, Selmi’s analysis 
raises questions about the EEOC’s injunctive practices. If, as we find, the 
EEOC pursues the same kinds of limited injunctive remedies that he 
criticizes, that casts some doubt on his theory that prioritization of 
monetary relief over structural reform explains the predominance of such 
remedies. 
* * * 
 
 
 81. Id. at 1331. 
 82. See id. at 1297. 
 83. See 18 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012). 
 84. Selmi does not assess how the EEOC fits into his model, but he suggests that government-
initiated litigation in the past looked different from today’s large private class action. See id. at 1311. 
At the same time, he criticizes the agency’s recent efforts in large class action suits as “almost 
comically inept.” Id. Selmi also suggests that EEOC involvement in private class actions—for 
example, as a monitor of consent decrees—might help to restore the public interest focus of these 
cases. See id. at 1330; see also Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s 
Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2–3 (1996) [hereinafter Selmi, Value of 
the EEOC] (arguing that the EEOC “ought to provide some value that is different from what could be 
provided by private attorneys since there are obvious costs to having a public agency process claims”). 
 85. See, e.g., EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. 
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The literature thus offers three accounts of structural reform of the 
workplace in response to civil rights laws. The gladiator theory focuses on 
large-scale cases, depicting litigation as battle and the injunctions obtained 
as intrusively transformational of recalcitrant institutions. The 
collaboration theory emphasizes litigation-driven experimentation, 
information sharing and accountability as the pathways to meaningfully 
reforming biased decision-making processes. And what we will call 
managerialism theory highlights organizations’ voluntary responses to the 
legal prohibition against discrimination by adopting a standard set of 
bureaucratic responses, such as EEO policies, training programs, and 
grievance procedures, without much regard to whether they operate to 
integrate the workplace. Our purpose here is not to resolve debates over 
which approach would be most effective in combating employment 
discrimination. Rather, our aim is to examine the activities of one 
particularly important player—the EEOC—to understand more about how 
it pursues structural reform through its litigation activities. 
II. THE EEOC AS A STRUCTURAL REFORM PLAINTIFF 
The EEOC plays a unique role in the scheme established by Congress 
for enforcement of Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes. 
Employees who believe they have been discriminated against must first 
file a charge against their employer with the EEOC.
86
 The Commission 
processes tens of thousands of charges annually, investigating the 
allegations and determining whether or not there is cause to believe that 
discrimination occurred.
87
 At any time after 180 days from the filing of the 
charge, complaining employees are entitled to a “right to sue” letter, which 
authorizes them to seek redress against the employer in federal district 
 
 
 86. Litigants are required to first exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge with the 
EEOC when alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, or 
pregnancy, see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012), age, see the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012), and disability, see the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012). In addition, the EEOC was recently given the 
responsibility of receiving claims of genetic discrimination under Title II of the Genetic Information 
Non-Discrimination Act of 2008. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-11 (2012). Alternatively, 
employees may file charges with state fair employment agencies where they exist. For simplicity, we 
refer here only to the EEOC’s role. 
 87. See, e.g., Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Aug. 16, 2014).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/7
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court.
88
 Numerous charges exit the administrative process in this way, 
often before the EEOC has completed investigation, and in the period here 
examined private plaintiffs filed fourteen to twenty-five thousand 
employment discrimination cases each year in federal district courts.
89
 In 
cases in which the EEOC proceeds to a “cause” finding, the agency tries to 
“conciliate” or settle the charge with the employer. If no agreement is 
reached, the EEOC may choose to file a lawsuit on behalf of the charging 
party.
90
 The charging party has the right to retain her own lawyer and 
intervene in the EEOC’s lawsuit.91 
During the period of this study, the EEOC filed a few hundred cases 
each year in federal court.
92
 Many of those cases sought modest 
compensation for just one or a handful of people. Although the resolution 
of those cases often included simple injunctive measures, such as banning 
discrimination and posting an anti-discrimination policy, they essentially 
addressed individual grievances. In other cases, the EEOC aimed to have a 
broader effect. In carrying out its mission of “promot[ing] equality of 
opportunity in the workplace,”93 the Commission has—to varying degrees 
over time—emphasized its commitment to opposing systemic 
discrimination.
94
 A 2006 Task Force Report highlighted the Commission’s 
 
 
 88. Section 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012); 29 
C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (2013).  
 89. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, tbl. C-
2A, annually, for years 1997–2006, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/ 
archive.aspx (follow each year hyperlink; under “Detailed Statistical Tables, the link for “U.S. District 
Courts—Civil,” and then follow “C-2A”).  
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012). Although the agency was initially only empowered to seek 
conciliation when it found a claim to be meritorious, see Selmi, Value of the EEOC, supra note 84, at 
5; Belton, supra note 12, at 918. Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to, among other things, give the 
EEOC the power to sue in federal court to vindicate the rights of complaining employees. 
 91. On occasion, a charging party obtains a right to sue letter and files suit in federal court first. 
The EEOC may then choose to intervene in the private lawsuit. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, EEOC, 
REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (2005), available at www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/manual. Based 
on the cases sampled in the EEOC Litigation Project, this party configuration is far less common. 
 92. That level of new litigation filings has decreased in recent years; in the first Obama 
administration, filings were in the 200-300 range, and in 2012, down to 122. See EEOC Litigation 
Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2013, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ 
litigation.cfm (last visited Aug. 16, 2014); EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FY 
2012 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/2012par_discussion.cfm. 
 93. See Fiscal Year 2008 Performance and Accounting Report Highlights, Mission Statement, 
EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/2008/highlights.html (last updated 
Jan. 9, 2009). 
 94. In the late 1970s, the EEOC had a set of criteria for systemic investigation “designed to focus 
on the worst discriminators first.” Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity and 
Affirmative Action, Part I: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House 
of Rep. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 97th Cong. 321 (1981) (statement of J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting 
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“unique role and responsibility in combating systemic discrimination,” 
defining its “systemic” cases as: “pattern or practice, policy and/or class 
cases where the alleged discrimination has a broad impact on an industry, 
profession, company, or geographic location.”95 For much of its history 
the EEOC has seemed to consider its systemic cases the most important 
component of the agency’s litigation docket. These are the cases that 
receive attention in congressional oversight hearings, and that the EEOC 
features in its annual reports,
96
 agency histories,
97
 and the like.  
The EEOC sees itself as not only bearing the responsibility to bring 
cases attacking systemic discrimination, but also having a particular ability 
to do so. As the Task Force argued:  
For several reasons, EEOC is also uniquely positioned to litigate 
systemic cases. First, unlike private litigants, EEOC need not meet 
the stringent requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in order to maintain a class suit in federal court. Second, 
as a practical matter, EEOC may be able to bring certain systemic 
cases that the private bar is not likely to handle, for example, where 
the monetary relief might be limited, the focus is on injunctive 
relief, or the victims are in underserved communities. . . . Finally, 
the Task Force believes that EEOC’s nationwide presence permits it 
to act as a large yet highly specialized law firm with a unique role in 
civil rights enforcement.
98
  
But the Commission has not necessarily been successful in fully 
leveraging these advantages. The Task Force report itself criticized the 
 
 
EEOC Chair). These criteria included factors such as low utilization rates of women or minorities and 
use of policies or practices with a disparate impact on women or minorities. Richard I. Lehr, EEOC 
Case-Handling Procedures: Problems and Solutions, 34 ALA. L. REV. 241, 255–56 (1983) (describing 
then-extant provision of the EEOC Compliance Manual). However, the Commission drastically cut 
back its large-case litigation during the 1980s, opting instead for an approach that emphasized full 
investigations for each individual charge. See Hearing Before House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th 
Cong. 332, 338 (1986). See generally Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955 (1993). By the mid-1990s, systemic litigation was again a priority. See 
EEOC, NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PLAN (1995), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/nep.cfm. 
Unlike during the Reagan and Bush I administrations, the EEOC during the Bush II years never 
disavowed interest in systemic litigation; indeed, the 2006 Task Force review and resulting reforms 
took place during the Bush administration.  
 95. EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 1–2.  
 96. See, e.g., EEOC, FY 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2008), available 
at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/2008/par2008.pdf. 
 97. See, e.g., Focusing Enforcement Efforts on Systemic Discrimination, EEOC, http://www. 
eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1970s/focusing.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). 
 98. EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. 
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agency’s failure to bring more such cases, noting that while the “EEOC 
has successfully investigated, conciliated and litigated numerous systemic 
cases,” the Commission “does not consistently and proactively identify 
systemic discrimination.”99 Observers agree both that the cases are 
important, and that the EEOC has not paid them sufficient attention. For 
example, Selmi has criticized the EEOC for “concentrat[ing] on individual 
rather than class action litigation”100 that could help revive the public 
nature of the civil rights suits.  
Regardless of whether the EEOC could have done more to pursue 
systemic discrimination, the agency is clearly an important subject of 
study for understanding litigation as a means to structural reform of the 
workplace. Although private litigants bring the bulk of federal lawsuits 
under Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes, only a tiny 
proportion of these—between 0.6 and 1.1% during our period of study—
are class actions.
101
 Moreover, as Selmi has argued, class action cases are 
not necessarily about structural reform; private litigants may be primarily 
pursuing monetary relief, rather than reform of the workplace.
102
 In 
contrast, the EEOC has expressly argued for the importance of structural 
reform cases and its public statements suggest that it views them as a 
particularly significant part of its work.
103
 As explained in detail in Part 
IV, infra, we attempt to identify the EEOC’s systemic cases and estimate 
that they amounted to about 9% of its litigation docket during the period of 
our study. 
Because the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Wal-Mart appears to 
make it more difficult to certify employment discrimination class 
actions,
104
 the EEOC’s efforts in seeking relief for groups of workers will 
gain in significance. As discussed above, the EEOC is not required to 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 in order to pursue broad-based claims 
 
 
 99. Id. at Executive Summary, 1. 
 100. Selmi, Value of the EEOC, supra note 84, at 21. 
 101. We derive the estimate in text from Nelson and Nielsen’s data, which they generously shared 
with us; they assembled a random sample of 1788 employment discrimination cases filed between 
1987 and 2003 in seven large districts, and found fifteen class actions among them—.08%. For 
published papers using their data, see Ellen Berrey, Steve G. Hoffman & Laura Beth Nielsen, Situated 
Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Fairness and Inequality in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 
46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1 (2012); Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, & Ryon Lancaster, Individual 
Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil 
Rights United States” 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2010).  
 102. Selmi, Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1297. 
 103. See, e.g., EEOC, EEOC, FY 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 
96, at 10.  
 104. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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of discrimination, and observers expect that it will play a larger role in 
pursuing systemic discrimination in the future.
105
 Understanding its 
injunctive practices is thus crucial for assessing existing theories of 
structural reform and considering the prospects for such efforts in the 
future.  
III. THE CASE STUDIES  
In order to get a textured sense of the EEOC’s injunctive practices 
during the period of our study, we undertook three case studies by 
interviewing the lawyers involved and closely examining the case 
documents. The first case, EEOC v. Dial Corporation,
106
 alleged sexual 
harassment of women workers. In the second, EEOC v. McKesson Water 
Products,
107
 the Commission joined with private counsel and a non-profit 
public interest organization to sue over discriminatory pay of African-
American truck drivers. And in the third, the EEOC brought two separate 
lawsuits, each captioned EEOC v. PJAX,
108
 on theories of sex and 
disability discrimination. Although we selected these cases simply to 
cover a range of situations—big and medium in size, alleging race and sex 
discrimination, and involving differing roles for private counsel—they 
turned out to map onto our theoretical landscape well. Dial has some, 
though not all, of the attributes the gladiator theory might predict; 
McKesson might look somewhat familiar to a collaboration theorist; and 
the result obtained in PJAX largely fits the managerialism description. As 
Part IV will confirm, however, PJAX is most typical of the EEOC’s 
systemic docket. One feature that emerges from the case studies that is 
worth highlighting, though it is tangential to this Article’s particular 
project, is that the conduct alleged is not subtle second-generation-type 
 
 
 105. See supra Introduction. 
 106. EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (documents and information 
available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 
7947). 
 107. EEOC v. McKesson Water Prods., No. 2:01-cv-09496-FMC-PJW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 5, 
2001) (documents and other information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9099). 
 108. EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., No. 2:03-cv-00759-TFM-IJS (W.D. Pa., filed May 27, 2003) was a 
sexual harassment case. Documents and other information on this case are available at CIVIL RIGHTS 
LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8756. EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., 
1:03-cv-01535-JFM (D. Md., filed May 27, 2003), concerned hiring. Documents and other information 
on this case are available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse. 
net/detail.php?id=8801. 
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discrimination. Rather, the allegations include blatant and egregious race 
and sex discrimination.
109
 
A. Dial
110
: A Gladiator Case? 
In 1996, Beverly Allen, an employee at the Dial Corporation’s soap 
manufacturing plant in Illinois filed a charge with the EEOC, in which she 
claimed repeat and severe harassment from 1992 through 1995, and 
retaliation for complaints about that harassment.
111
 The EEOC took over 
two years to investigate; in March 1998, it made a “reasonable cause” 
finding in her favor.
112
 Statutorily required attempts at conciliation made 
little progress. The EEOC requested $300,000 (the statutory cap) in 
damages for Allen; Dial offered $5000.
113
 The positions on injunctive 
relief were similarly far apart. One of the EEOC’s attorneys recalls that the 
EEOC insisted on a class-wide settlement, and Dial was equally resolute 
that it would deal only with the charging party’s grievance.114 
Accordingly, the EEOC filed suit in May 1999, alleging a pattern and 
practice of sex discrimination by the creation of a hostile work 
environment thick with sexual harassment and sex-based harassment, and 
sought monetary relief for all those who had suffered harassment, as well 
as prospective injunctive relief.
115
  
This case might be thought to meet the “gladiator” description. Dial, a 
billion dollar company,
116
 was a free-spending opponent, and the litigation 
 
 
 109. For a more systematic analysis that similarly finds a great deal of remaining first-generation 
discrimination, see VINCENT J. ROSCIGNO, THE FACE OF DISCRIMINATION: HOW RACE AND GENDER 
IMPACT WORK AND HOME LIVES (2007). Selmi similarly argues that the nature of discrimination in 
high profile class actions has stayed largely the same, involving overt racial discrimination and 
stereotyping of women’s interests as workers. See Selmi, Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 
1297. 
 110. This case study is based on review of the district court case docket, the Complaint, six district 
court opinions, the Consent Decree, several press releases, and three monitors’ reports, and as well as 
on Schlanger’s interviews of monitors Reginald Jones and Nancy Kreiter and EEOC lawyers Noelle 
Brennan, Jean Powers Kamp, and John Hendrickson. For the documents, see supra note 106. Notes 
from the interviews are on file with the authors.  
 111. See Dial, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 930. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 941–42. 
 114. Telephone Interview with Noelle Brennan, former EEOC attorney (Oct. 30, 2009).  
 115. Complaint at 2–4, Dial, 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (No. 1:99-cv-03356). 
 116. See Press Release, EEOC, Judge in Dial Sexual Harassment Case Denies Soap Maker’s ‘Eve 
of Trial’ Bid on Punitive Damages Issue (Apr. 24, 2003), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-24-
03-b.html. Dial was acquired by the German conglomerate Henkel Corporation in 2004 for $2.875 
billion. See HENKEL, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 60, available at http://www.henkel.com/com/content_ 
data/2005.02.22_FY_2004_annualreport_en.pdf.  
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was intense and extremely contentious. Dial hired Seyfarth Shaw, an 
employer-side employment litigation firm with a national reputation for 
aggressive defense tactics. Among other defenses, Dial attacked the 
sufficiency of the notice it received during the administrative process, the 
Commission’s jurisdiction over the broad pattern-or-practice case, and the 
conciliation process.
117
 It attacked, as well, the very idea of systemic 
litigation in a sexual harassment case, and the merits of the EEOC’s case.  
Judge Warren Urbom, a Nixon appointee to the District of Nebraska 
sitting by designation in the Northern District of Illinois, rejected these 
arguments in a thorough opinion in 2001.
118
 The EEOC’s evidence 
suggested “that the work environment at [Dial] was sexually charged in a 
way that was offensive and demeaning to women.”119 It detailed extensive 
sexual behavior targeting dozens of women, including male employees 
touching women’s breasts and buttocks, exposing themselves to their 
female co-workers or touching their genitals while making suggestive or 
threatening remarks, as well as open displays of sexually explicit 
materials.  
For two years, the case proceeded towards jury trial, which was 
eventually scheduled for April 28, 2003.
120
 In the months prior to trial, 
Judge Urbom rejected a number of Dial’s attempts to limit the introduction 
of various types of evidence against it and also held that if the jury hearing 
the liability case decided in favor of liability, that same jury could then 
assess punitive damages as well.
121
 The EEOC’s attorneys explain that this 
was a crucial pro-plaintiff ruling, allowing the EEOC to present its case in 
the way most likely to convince the jury to make a large punitive damages 
award. Regional attorney John Hendrickson, the lead EEOC lawyer on the 
case (and described by one of the case’s monitors as “probably the most 
successful EEOC lawyer in the country”122) gives much of the credit for 
 
 
 117. See Docket, Dial, 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (No. 1:99-cv-03356), available at 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-IL-0075-9000.pdf. 
 118. See Dial, 156 F. Supp.2d 926. 
 119. Id. at 950. 
 120. In the meantime the EEOC filed another, unrelated case against the Dial Corporation, 
involving allegations of discriminatory physical tests for factory jobs in a meat processing plant in 
Iowa. This matter went to trial in 2004, and Dial was assessed over $3 million in back-pay, a judgment 
affirmed by the 8th Circuit in 2006. See EEOC v. Dial Corp., No. 3:02-CV-10109, 2005 WL 2839977 
(S.D. Iowa Sept. 29, 2005) aff’d in part and remanded, 469 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2006) (documents and 
information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse. 
net/detail.php?id=9306). 
 121. See EEOC v. Dial Corp., No. 1:99-cv-03356 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-IL-0075-0018.pdf. 
 122. Telephone Interview with George F. Galland, Dial Monitor (Oct. 28, 2009). 
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the subsequent settlement to that ruling; it provided, he says, “powerful 
leverage,”123 because it allowed the EEOC to “structure the case for trial in 
a way that was, we thought, equitable but very favorable.”124 The most 
crucial incentive to settle, however, was the prospect of the impending 
trial. Hendrickson recalls that at a technology run-through in the 
courtroom on the Friday before the Monday trial was scheduled to start, it 
was clear to the defendants—both Dial’s corporate leadership and their 
lawyers—that the EEOC was more than ready for trial. Even more 
important, he believes, was that the trial would likely have been a public 
relations disaster for Dial.
125
 Dial’s status as a familiar household brand 
(“Aren’t you glad you use Dial? Don’t you wish everybody did?”126), 
joined with the dramatic accusations of sexual misconduct on the plant 
floor, made the case very interesting to the press. The result was, he says, 
“the folks in the main corporate office wanted this case done; they didn’t 
want to read about it” in the newspapers. And so, Hendrickson explains, 
they instructed their lawyers to “settle this god-damned case!”127  
But with the trial scheduled to begin in just a couple of days, there was 
not much time to negotiate. Judge Urbom was clear; he was holding a trial 
unless the parties gave him a signed settlement by Monday morning. The 
negotiators needed a template, a “go-by.” They chose the decree from a 
prior high-profile EEOC case, against Mitsubishi, which had been 
negotiated in 1998 by essentially the same team of EEOC lawyers. The 
Mitsubishi case had settled for $34 million.
128
 In the Dial settlement, Dial 
agreed to pay $10 million into a class fund to be disbursed to eligible class 
members: women who had experienced harassment at Dial’s Illinois 
facility between 1988 and 2003.
129
 The amount was at the time the second 
highest sexual harassment settlement in the Commission’s history,130 and 
 
 
 123. Telephone Interview with John Hendrickson, Regional Attorney, EEOC (Oct. 16, 2009).  
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See 65 Years of Dial, DIAL SOAP, http://www.dialsoap.com/65-years-of-dial (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2014) (follow “Select a decade: 1950” and then follow the arrows through “Facts” until 
reaching 1953). 
 127. Interview with John Hendrickson, supra note 123. 
 128. Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Decree at ¶ 17, EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 
Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (No. 1:96-cv-01192-JBM). Documents and information are 
available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 
9787. 
 129. Consent Decree at ¶ 20, EEOC v. Dial Corp., No. 1:99-cv-003356 (N.D. Ill. 2003), available 
at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-IL-0075-0006.pdf. 
 130. In 1998, the Commission reached a $34 million settlement against Mitsubishi, and a $9.85 
million settlement against the pharmaceutical company Astra. See EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., No. 4:98-
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the fourth highest award in any type of case in the time here studied. The 
EEOC and an appointed Special Master were assigned to allocate the 
funds among the various claimants, with no claimant to receive more than 
$300,000. In the end, about 100 claimants received a total of about $10 
million in disbursed damages.
131
 And the settlement also contained a great 
many injunctive provisions, some very ordinary but others quite unusual in 
EEOC litigation. 
To begin with the ordinary: the Dial decree had a typical “thou shalt 
not” section, prohibiting sexual harassment and retaliation:  
Dial and its officers, agents, management (including supervisory 
employees) . . . are enjoined, from: (i) discriminating against 
women on the basis of sex; (ii) engaging in or being a party to any 
action, policy or practice that is intended to or is known to them to 
have the effect of sexually harassing or intimidating any female 
employee on the basis of her gender; and/or (iii) creating, 
facilitating or tolerating the existence of a work environment that is 
sexually hostile to female employees . . . . 
 Dial and its officers, agents, management (including supervisory 
employees) . . . are enjoined, from: engaging in, implementing or 
tolerating any action, policy or practice with the purpose of 
retaliating against any current or former employee of Dial because 
he or she opposed any practice of sexual harassment made unlawful 
under Title VII . . . .
132
 
These sorts of clauses are all-but-universal in the EEOC’s decrees, 
systemic and non-systemic alike. As is obvious, they do not add anything 
substantive to the obligations imposed by Title VII and the other anti-
discrimination statutes. Rather, their function is to abbreviate the remedial 
process in the event of a violation, rendering the employer subject to 
immediate court intervention without a new charging party, statutory 
conciliation process, or new district court complaint.  
 
 
cv-40014-NMG, 1999 WL 342043 (D. Mass May 20, 1999), at *1 (documents and information 
available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 
8308); Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Decree, supra note 128. 
 131. Press Release, EEOC, Monitors Report Consent Decree in Sexual Harassment Case is 
Working at Dial (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-IL-
0075-0010.pdf. 
 132. Consent Decree at 4–5, Dial, supra note 129. 
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In another provision typical in EEOC systemic cases, Dial agreed to 
various revisions of its “No Harassment Policy” and its complaint 
procedure. For example, Dial agreed to “revise its policies . . . to enable 
complaining parties to be interviewed by Dial about their complaints in 
such a manner that permits the complaining party, at such party’s election, 
to provide information in a confidential manner . . . .”133 As in nearly all 
the EEOC’s decrees, Dial also agreed to train line staff and supervisors in 
their obligation to avoid sexual harassment, and anyone with responsibility 
for complaints in how to respond to complaints.
134
 And Dial agreed to post 
notices throughout its plant explaining the decree and the anti-harassment 
policy
135—yet another all-but-universal provision of the EEOC’s decrees.  
The Dial decree looked much less typical in other ways, however. 
First, Dial agreed to incorporate EEO principles into its employee 
performance management; the decree included a number of “policies 
designed to promote supervisor accountability,” promising to discipline 
any supervisor who engaged in or tolerated sexual harassment,
136
 and to 
“link” “evaluation of [each] supervisor’s handling of equal employment 
opportunity issues . . . directly to supervisor salary/bonus structure.”137 In 
addition, the Decree gave specified outsiders extensive workplace 
authority and access; Dial agreed to give monitoring authority to three 
“consent decree monitors”—one picked by Dial, one by the EEOC, and 
the Chair by both parties.  
The EEOC’s Hendrickson explains that the ideal monitor combines 
“fundamental dedication to equity and civil rights in the workplace” with 
“steel in their spine” and a pro-business attitude.138 “To be effective,” he 
says, a monitor “needs to see that business can do better without 
discriminating, and to want to show the business how,” and “needs to have 
a tough side but also to be diplomatic.”139 The parties picked three 
monitors with substantial backgrounds in employment anti-discrimination. 
Nancy Kreiter, chosen by the EEOC, had previously been a monitor in the 
Mitsubishi case and the research director of the nonprofit organization 
Women Employed. Reginald Jones was Dial’s pick; just finished with his 
service as one of President Clinton’s Republican appointees to the EEOC 
 
 
 133. Id. at 11. 
 134. Id. at 12. 
 135. Id. at 11. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 12. 
 138. Interview with John Hendrickson, supra note 123. 
 139. Id. 
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itself, he had previously been a partner at Seyfarth Shaw, Dial’s law firm. 
The EEOC and Dial together picked George Galland as the monitors’ 
chair; Galland, like Kreiter, had played the same role in the Mitsubishi 
case.
140
 
The three decree monitors were assigned to evaluate and recommend 
changes to “all existing employment policies, procedures and practices” 
relating to the subject matter of the case.
141
 Dial agreed in advance to 
implement all recommended changes, unless the Court permitted 
otherwise after hearing Dial’s objections. The monitors also had reporting 
obligations; they were to assess Dial’s compliance with the decree and the 
effectiveness of its policies in achieving non-harassment. The Chair of the 
decree monitoring panel was also given investigation and appeal authority 
over harassment complaints.
142
  
Appointing outside monitors is a fairly standard remedy in much civil 
rights injunctive litigation, but relatively uncommon in EEOC cases. 
Although outsiders were brought in as consultants in about 12% of the 
EEOC’s systemic cases in our sample, in less than 4%—just nine cases 
over the entire decade—were they named as “monitors” and given 
concomitant stature. Perhaps the outsider received greater access in the 
Dial case because of the scope of the violations, or because the EEOC’s 
own relationship with Dial was insufficiently cordial
143
 to make 
monitoring by the EEOC palatable or productive. Or perhaps the EEOC 
thought that it needed more thoroughgoing change and that an HR person 
who answered to Dial managers would lack the independence or authority 
to implement it. EEOC Regional Attorney John Hendrickson explains that 
the EEOC seeks imposition of a monitor or monitors only where “the 
situation is pretty egregious.”144 And the EEOC’s lawyers we interviewed 
agreed that when a settlement seems to need a great deal of follow-up, 
they try to get a monitor or consultant appointed rather than seeking 
 
 
 140. For the identities of the monitors, see Consent Decree at 13, Dial, supra note 129. For their 
backgrounds, see Telephone Interview with Nancy Kreiter, Dial Monitor (Nov. 18, 2009); Interview 
with Reginald Jones, Dial Monitor (Nov. 11, 2009). 
 141. Consent Decree at 13, Dial, supra note 129. 
 142. See id. at 13–15. 
 143. In addition to the case profiled here and the 2002 Iowa case mentioned above, the EEOC 
litigated a third major case against Dial, dealing with sexual harassment, in the early 1990s. See EEOC 
v. Dial Corp., No. 4:95-cv-01726 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 13, 1995). This kind of litigation history against the 
same employer by the Commission is quite uncommon, even for a company as large as Dial—after all, 
the EEOC brings only a few hundred cases each year, nationwide.  
 144. Interview with John Hendrickson, supra note 123. By contrast, he describes “serious money” 
as “the lingua franca of business” and therefore more universally sought.  
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themselves to get inside and change the corporate culture. Lawyers, they 
say, typically move on to the next case; corporate culture change is what 
monitors are for. In this case, the monitors were quite active. They 
surveyed and interviewed dozens, even hundreds of employees, developed 
policy, reviewed online training, and generally supervised anti-harassment 
activities for a period of two-and-a-half years.
145
  
The settlement terms just described might appear to support a 
collaborationist account. But that’s not the approach the parties describe. 
Monitor Nancy Kreiter says, for example, that where some firms facing 
monitorships “want to take advantage of the consent decree, and become a 
model,” Dial was more interested in a more limited version of 
compliance.
146
 The reason, it seems, was the continuation of the 
conflictual mindset after the settlement. Dial’s lawyers and officers did not 
agree to our interview requests, but the EEOC’s lawyers believe that the 
settlement was forced on Dial’s lawyers by its business people for 
business reasons.
147
 It was the impending public relations fiasco, not a 
sudden conviction that Dial had done anything wrong, that drove the 
settlement—and defense counsel’s unhappiness was palpable to the 
participants even at the press conference announcing the purportedly 
amicable resolution. Over the next several years, lawyers continued to run 
the compliance process (Dial apparently had a very small and quite 
uninvolved HR department), and continued to believe that their company 
had been unfairly accused.
148
 The litigation mindset was marked enough 
that Dial’s own chosen monitor, Reginald Jones, hinted several years later 
at the problems caused. Jones wrote an article entitled “Ten Tips for 
Employment Class Action Consent Decree Settlement Survival,” and 
listed as Item 1: 
Settle if you want to or litigate if you must. Don’t try to do both in 
the consent decree. . . . Parties . . . first need to let go of the 
allegations, facts and issues that prompted the litigation in the first 
place. . . . If any party insists on continuing to try to vindicate their 
 
 
 145. Final Report of the Consent Decree Monitors to the Parties and the Court, EEOC v. Dial 
Corp., No. 1:99-cv-03356 (N.D. Ill., 2005), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/ 
EE-IL-0075-0012.pdf. 
 146. Interview with Nancy Kreiter, supra note 140. 
 147. Interview with John Hendrickson, supra note 123. 
 148. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source (Nov. 2009). 
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litigation posture they will subvert the healing and normalization 
that the settlement contemplates.
149
  
Although it is impossible to determine whether monitoring or some other 
factor was responsible, the reports suggest that the environment at the Dial 
plant improved substantially over the life of the decree; surveyed 
employees reported that the sexual harassment they had seen in the past 
was no longer tolerated or present.
150
  
It is worth noting, too, that while there was ongoing conflict, no post-
decree disputes developed into litigated enforcement of any type; the 
docket is devoid of post-decree interventions.
151
 As one of the monitors 
describes it, “There was resistance, at various points, to things we 
suggested, but not resistance that ever stopped anything from happening 
that we thought should happen.” Management “moaned and groaned and 
hollered and screamed behind the scenes,” but never actually got to the 
point of contesting anything the monitors did.
152
  
This case was an outlier in several ways. Its use of a monitoring 
team—shared with just 4% of the systemic docket—has already been 
noted. It also had more discovery and substantive motions than usual—
twelve, which puts it at the ninety-fifth percentile of resolved cases in the 
sample. And it took longer than usual to come to closure—nearly four 
years (ninety-seventh percentile). Its decree is relatively long—nineteen 
pages (seventy-sixth percentile). But even as an outlier, while the case 
clearly generated considerable heat, the conflict was, contra the gladiator 
theory, insufficient to drive anyone back into court after the settlement. 
B. McKesson Water Products
153
: Collaborationist? 
In 1998, Steven Crutchfield and seven other African-American 
employees filed charges with the EEOC accusing their employer of race 
 
 
 149. Reginald E. Jones, Ten Tips for Employment Class Action Consent Decree Settlement 
Survival, THE PRACTICAL LITIGATOR, Sept. 2006, at 37. 
 150. See, e.g., Second Year Report of the Consent Decree Monitors to the Parties and to the Court, 
Dial, No. 1:99-cv-03356 (N.D. Ill. 2005), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/ 
public/EE-IL-0075-0015.pdf; Final Report of the Consent Decree Monitors to the Parties and the 
Court, Dial, No. 1:99-cv-03356 (N.D. Ill. 2005), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/ 
chDocs/public/EE-IL-0075-0012.pdf.  
 151. See Docket, Dial, supra note 117. 
 152. Interview with Reginald Jones, Dial Monitor (Nov. 11, 2009). 
 153. This case study is based on court papers and interviews with EEOC lawyers Anna Park and 
Dana Johnson, Consultant Heidi Olguin, and class counsel Tony Lawson, Kendra Tanacea, and 
Jocelyn Larkin. We were unable to obtain interviews of lawyers or management for the defendant.  
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discrimination in pay and work assignments. The charging parties 
worked for Sparkletts, a water delivery company owned by McKesson 
Water Products, a billion dollar processor, marketer, and distributor of 
bottled water. The complainants alleged that African-American drivers 
were assigned routes in low-income neighborhoods, which were often less 
profitable than routes in more affluent areas, and then paid them on the 
basis of their routes’ profitability.154 Crutchfield’s cousin’s husband was 
Tony Lawson, an experienced class action employment lawyer in private 
practice, and Lawson represented the complaining employees from the 
start.
155
 He was able to devote substantial resources to it because of a grant 
he received from the Impact Fund,
156
 an organization that provides support 
to small firms litigating big civil rights cases.
157
 As Lawson described the 
allegations later, “Black drivers understood that they would work the so-
called ‘ghetto routes’ while Beverly Hills would be handled by white 
drivers.”158 The EEOC’s investigation supported the charging parties’ 
claims.
159
 At that point, the Commission and the parties entered into 
settlement negotiations. At first those negotiations went nowhere—
Lawson describes McKesson as “adamant that they weren’t going to 
settle.”160 McKesson brought in outside counsel and began a competing 
analysis of the racial impact of Sparkletts route assignments. But then 
McKesson sold Sparkletts to Danone, the much larger French company 
best known in the U.S. for its Dannon yogurt.
161
 Danone’s French 
management had a completely different view about the matter; Danone 
didn’t want the U.S. government as an opponent, and also felt much less 
loyalty to local management.
162
 Indeed, French management got very 
much involved, even flying over to negotiate settlement terms. In addition, 
 
 
 154. Press Release, EEOC, Court Approves $1.2 Million Settlement Between EEOC and 
McKesson for Race Discrimination (Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/3-6-02. 
html; http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-CA-0138-0003.pdf; Amended Consent Decree, 
EEOC v. McKesson Water Prods. Co., Case No. 2:01-cv-09496-FMC-PJW, (C.D. Ca., May 10, 2002), 
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-CA-0138-0002.pdf. 
 155. Telephone Interview with Tony Lawson, Attorney, Lawson Law Offices (Nov. 4, 2009). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See IMPACT FUND, http://www.impactfund.org/index.php?cat_id=4 (last visited Aug. 21, 
2014). 
 158. Press Release, supra note 154.  
 159. Amended Consent Decree, McKesson, supra note 154. 
 160. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155. 
 161. Indraneel Sur, McKesson to Sell Sparkletts Unit to French Food Firm, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 
2000), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2000/jan/12/business/fi-53114. 
 162. Telephone Interview with Kendra Tanacea, Attorney (Nov. 5, 2009). 
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Danone’s American general counsel, who was African American, was 
very interested in cleaning shop in its new acquisition.
163
  
On November 5, 2001, the parties filed, simultaneously, the EEOC’s 
complaint, a private intervenors’ complaint, class certification papers, and 
a proposed consent decree.
164
 Judge Florence-Marie Cooper, a district 
judge appointed by President Clinton to the Central District of California, 
in Los Angeles, held a preliminary hearing on class certification later that 
month, and a fairness hearing in February 2002, at which she approved the 
settlement. Under the agreement, eighty-five current and former 
employees, and their lawyers, received $1.7 million from Danone. Danone 
also agreed to injunctive relief and monitoring of that relief’s 
implementation.
165
  
As one would expect in an EEOC case, the decree prohibited 
discrimination, mandated development of an anti-discrimination policy, 
and required EEO training for employees. It also included substantial 
document retention and reporting requirements, to enable the plaintiffs’ 
counsel and the EEOC to monitor compliance and progress. Like the Dial 
decree, the McKesson decree had several provisions for bringing in 
outsiders—here, an “EEO consultant”—to assist and sometimes to decide 
various issues.
166
  
But even more than the Dial decree just described, and unlike the PJAX 
decree described next, the McKesson decree departed considerably from 
most of the EEOC’s decrees, in a variety of ways. First, the role of 
plaintiffs’ counsel was much more pronounced; responsibility for policy 
development was shared in the first instance not only by the EEO 
consultant and the defendant, but also by private class counsel and the 
EEOC. Second, the decree intervened much more deeply than the typical 
case in the basic employment terms for the drivers. Pay went from 
commission to an hourly wage,
167
 and—guided, class counsel Tony 
Lawson says, by workers’ preferences—route assignments went from 
 
 
 163. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155; Telephone Interview with Jocelyn Larkin, 
Attorney, Impact Fund (Oct. 19, 2009). 
 164. See Docket, EEOC v. McKesson Water Prods., No. 2:01-cv-09496-FMC-PJW (C.D. Cal., 
filed Nov. 5, 2001), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-CA-0138-9000.pdf. 
 165. See Amended Consent Decree, McKesson, supra note 154, at 15. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155; see Amended Consent Decree, McKesson, 
supra note 154, at 15. 
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discretionary to seniority-based.
168
 This involvement of the workers in 
deciding the foundational issue of how pay and route assignments would 
be structured is the closest thing we found in all our research to a 
collaborationist dynamic.  
Even so, the decree was also notably managerialist—implementing 
management practices widely accepted quite apart from any civil rights 
impact. Indeed, a third unusual feature of the decree was its very high 
level of detail aimed at bureaucratizing and standardizing the hiring, 
assignment, and promotion processes. For example, the Decree provides:  
[The defendant] shall conspicuously post all openings in Class 
Positions as well as any open positions for Managers using an Open 
Position Notice. An opening is defined as any position, including 
route assignments and special assignment in the Los Angeles Metro 
Region other than a temporary vacancy of less than thirty days. For 
each opening, the Open Position Notice shall list the minimum 
qualifications for the position, the expected starting date, the 
procedure for submitting a bid, the deadline for submitting a bid, 
and the location/availability of the Job Description for the position, 
and the salary and, if bonus and commissions are part of the 
compensation for the position, average earnings potential for the 
route or position. The Open Position Notice shall be posted for a 
minimum of ten (10) business days in all facilities within the Los 
Angeles Metro Region, in a location that is readily accessible to all 
employees. The [defendant] shall also post all job openings covered 
by this Decree on an online system accessible to all employees.
169
  
The decree sets out similarly detailed provisions governing job bidding, 
route-assignment criteria, and route compensation.
170
 
Asked how the decree became so detailed, the participants report 
several causes. Private plaintiffs’ counsel emphasized their overall 
approach. They had a good deal of experience negotiating non-EEOC 
consent decrees, and tended, they themselves said, to take what some 
might consider an “overinclusive” approach to decree terms.171 And 
because they had negotiated many prior decrees, including in some large 
 
 
 168. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155; Interview with Jocelyn Larkin, supra note 163; 
Amended Consent Decree, supra note 167, at 15. 
 169. Amended Consent Decree, McKesson, supra note 154, at 14. 
 170. See id. at 14–16. 
 171. Interview with Kendra Tanacea, supra note 162. 
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cases,
172
 they had many models to choose from. In addition, both the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers and EEOC’s counsel reports that the impetus towards 
detail came equally from defendants’ in-house lawyers, who wanted 
specificity so they could ensure their company’s compliance.173 Perhaps 
because of the recent corporate acquisition of Sparkletts, in-house counsel 
“just didn’t have faith in the local managers, and wanted to take away as 
much as possible their ability to get out from underneath” the decree.174 
A fourth important difference between the McKesson decree and most 
of the EEOC decrees in our sample is its five-year term—exceptionally 
long for an EEOC settlement.
175
 Additionally, the settlement did not 
entirely quantify attorneys’ fees. The decree awarded plaintiffs’ private 
counsel $412,000 for their prior work, but Danone agreed to pay 
unspecified future fees for securing approval of the decree and 
implementing it over that five-year term.
176
 
Finally, the resulting implementation process was unusually 
comprehensive. Heidi-Jane Olguin, president of a civil rights consulting 
company called Progressive Management Resources (and married to a 
federal district judge who had previously been a civil rights lawyer
177
), 
was hired as a consultant; she and her partner worked extremely closely 
with both class counsel and management. The consultants provided 
training and were responsible for meeting the reporting requirements.
178
 It 
was even their phone number that was posted for reporting any subsequent 
complaints by employees.
179
 They coordinated and led the drafting of new 
policy, at meetings involving Danone management and class counsel (but 
not the EEOC).
180
 And class counsel, paid for their time by Danone under 
 
 
 172. Tony Lawson had worked for a number of years with long-time civil rights plaintiffs’ 
counsel Guy Saperstein, and he and his colleague Kendra Tanacea were able to review many large-
scale decrees, picking provisions to use as models. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155; 
Interview with Kendra Tanacea, supra note 162. 
 173. Telephone Interview with Dana Johnson, Attorney, EEOC (Nov. 2009).  
 174. Interview with Jocelyn Larkin, supra note 163. 
 175. For more information, see Table 5, row 3. 
 176. See Amended Consent Decree, McKesson, supra note 154. 
 177. For more on Ms. Olguin’s husband, District Judge Fernando Olguin, see generally 
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid= 
3454 (last visited Aug. 21, 2014); Press Release, The White House, President Obama Nominates Two 
to Serve on the US District Court (May 14, 2012), available at http://www.white house.gov/the-press-
office/2012/05/14/president-obama-nominates-two-serve-us-district-court. 
 178. See Amended Consent Decree, McKesson, supra note 154, at 11. 
 179. Telephone Interview with Heidi-Jane Olguin, President, Progressive Management Resources 
(Nov. 5, 2009). 
 180. Id.; Interview with Kendra Tanacea, supra note 162.  
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the decree, worked many, many hours. One of the lawyers, Kendra 
Tanacea, remembers the effort in detail:  
Our aim was to go into the company; we’d have 6:30 am meetings 
and explain the consent decree. . . . We went to every drivers’ room. 
Oxnard, Covina—Lancaster was the furthest out, a couple in 
downtown L.A. Maybe 12 branches. And we did it several times 
over the years. And then they would have a couple of Saturday half-
day trainings on new policies and discrimination and “train the 
trainer” exercises. We were part of all that.181  
As in the Dial litigation, where interview subjects emphasized that cases 
that called for monitoring required outsiders, our interview subjects agree 
that the EEOC simply does not do this kind of monitoring. Class counsel 
Tony Lawson counted this as a failing: the EEOC has “all these lawyers 
all over the country,” he said. “They should hire some to monitor decrees. 
. . . Too often they just sign off and there’s an agreement to make changes, 
but they don’t follow up.”182 The EEOC’s own lawyers confirmed that 
time-consuming monitoring is not their priority, although they obviously 
offered a somewhat different spin, explaining why private lawyers might 
be more interested in a collaborative approach than the EEOC is. Anna 
Park explained that when the EEOC is doing the monitoring, its lawyers 
think of compliance as pretty cut and dried: “For us, you comply [or] you 
don’t comply. On the key terms, we’re not really willing to budge.”183 
Private monitoring “might create a different dynamic,” she said, in part 
because those monitors are “paid by the company to monitor”; in those 
circumstances, the business model encourages getting along, and working 
things through. “There’s nothing wrong with collaboration,” she 
emphasized: “if the company says, well, what do you think is a better way 
to do it, and they listen to the answer, that’s fine.” But there’s always the 
danger that what collaboration actually means is undue flexibility: “it’s a 
strange dynamic, if the company is paying the lawyers. It’s a business.”184 
There is clearly money to be made in monitoring systemic decrees, 
both for plaintiffs’ lawyers and monitors or consultants. But Lawson 
emphasizes that only a very few firms are willing to put in the work, 
 
 
 181. Interview with Kendra Tanacea, supra note 162. 
 182. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155. 
 183. Telephone Interview with Anna Park, Regional Attorney, EEOC (Nov. 20, 2009). 
 184. Id. 
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which is far from glamorous, attracts no headlines, and receives only 
hourly compensation with no possibility of a large payoff:  
Very few private lawyers write into settlements the degree of 
monitoring that we did in McKesson. For the first year after the 
decree, we lived in L.A.; we were there every week. [Danone] knew 
we’d be there, staying involved. That meant they sent enough 
people to the meetings and kept things moving. That was how you 
assure that there’s more than changes in HR policy. Private lawyers 
often don’t do that. . . . It’s rare to have firms stay involved and do 
monitoring.
185
 
So if McKesson is a collaborative case, the features that put it in that 
category may reflect the involvement of private class counsel with 
unusually pronounced public interest orientation and experience, and an 
unusually high level of interest in implementation, whether because of its 
results or the regular compensation for their hours of effort. And it seems 
likely that the other unusual features of the case—the high level of detail 
and the concern for class counsel’s compensation—stem from the same 
causes.  
C. PJAX186: Managerialism 
Our third case, PJAX, is more typical of the EEOC’s systemic litigation 
than either Dial or McKesson. In 1999 and 2000, a number of employees 
filed discrimination charges with the EEOC against PJAX, a large 
Pennsylvania-based shipping company.
187
 The first complaint alleged 
gender-based harassment and disparagement; women told the EEOC 
stories of being screamed at by managers and owners using sexually 
derogatory terms, and of gender-specific requirements that they perform 
 
 
 185. Interview with Tony Lawson, supra note 155. 
 186. This case study is based on review of two cases, both captioned EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., one in 
the Western District of Pennsylvania, the other in the District of Maryland. The available documents in 
each include the district court case docket, the Complaint, the EEOC’s filed Complaint, and the 
Consent Decree. In addition, Schlanger conducted telephone interviews of PJAX’s lawyer, Scott 
Hardy, and EEOC lawyers Jean Clickner and Debra Lawrence. Notes from the interviews are on file 
with the authors. 
 187. See Complaint, EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., 1:03-cv-01535-JFM (D. Md., filed May 27, 2003), 
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-MD-0093-0001.pdf [hereinafter Md. 
Complaint, PJAX]; Complaint EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., 2:03-cv-00759-TFM-IJS (W.D. Pa., filed May 27, 
2003), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-PA-0133-0002.pdf [hereinafter 
Pa. Complaint, PJAX]. 
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personal chores for the owners such as picking up laundry and having the 
owners’ personal cars cleaned.188 One complainant said she was asked by 
a PJAX manager to perform sexual favors for his bookie, in order to 
reduce his gambling debt.
189
 In addition, other employees alleged that 
PJAX refused to hire older applicants, women, and people with disabilities 
for positions as drivers or dockworkers, and that it retaliated against those 
who protested against discrimination.  
The charges were filed in two EEOC offices, in Pittsburgh and in 
Baltimore. The resulting investigations were apparently only loosely 
coordinated,
190
 but it seems the unsuccessful conciliation negotiations 
occurred jointly. PJAX’s counsel complains that the EEOC did not try in 
good faith to conciliate the case
191
; the EEOC’s Maryland lawyer reports 
of PJAX that “they didn’t seem to take conciliation very seriously.”192 In 
May 2003, the EEOC simultaneously brought two suits in two different 
U.S. district courts; a case in the Western District of Pennsylvania focused 
on the sexual harassment charges while one in the District of Maryland 
alleged discriminatory failures to hire.
193
  
Like the investigation, the litigation process proceeded without much 
coordination between the two suits on the EEOC’s part, although the two 
cases were inextricably linked in the minds of the defendants. PJAX’s 
lawyer, Scott Hardy, felt that the sexual harassment case, in Pittsburgh, 
“interjected a lot more emotion.”194 It was the sexual harassment case that 
interested the press, which (following the EEOC’s standard procedure) 
was notified by press release when the litigation commenced.
195
 At the 
time, PJAX described the sexual harassment allegations as “unfounded 
and salacious.”196 Even six years later, in an interview, Hardy continued to 
describe the sexual harassment case as “vicious.”197 Far from encouraging 
settlement, in his view those accusations “caused people to be entrenched 
 
 
 188. See Md. Complaint, PJAX, supra note 187. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Telephone Interview with M. Jean Clickner, Attorney, EEOC (Oct. 20, 2009); Telephone 
Interview with Debra M. Lawrence, Attorney, EEOC (Nov. 4, 2009).  
 191. Telephone Interview with W. Scott Hardy, Partner, Cohen & Grisby (Oct. 30, 2009).  
 192. Interview with Debra M. Lawrence, supra note 190.  
 193. See Md. Complaint, PJAX, supra note 187; Pa. Complaint, PJAX, supra note 187. 
 194. Interview with W. Scott Hardy, supra note 191. 
 195. Press Release, EEOC, PJAX, Inc. Charged with Sexual Harassment and Failure to Hire Class 
of Women for Non-Traditional Jobs (May 27, 2003) (on file with authors). 
 196. Lou Ransom, U.S. Files Sex-Harassment Lawsuits Against Trucking Company, PITTSBURGH 
TRIB. REV. (May 28, 2003), http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/business/s_136705.html. 
 197. Interview with W. Scott Hardy, supra note 191. 
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and to want to defend themselves even more, and held up the resolution of 
the Baltimore [hiring] case.”198 The EEOC’s lawyers, of course, saw 
things differently. Jean Clickner, the EEOC’s lawyer in the Pittsburgh 
case, describes the sexual harassment that was the subject of that case as 
“over the top outrageous” and “really just endemic.”199 And the EEOC’s 
lawyers thought the resulting litigation provided pressure that was useful 
in resolving both cases. Debra Lawrence, who worked on the Baltimore 
case, explained, “I guess information sharing and coordinating our efforts 
makes us stronger; they throw a right punch out of Pittsburgh and we 
throw a left punch here.”200  
Notwithstanding the heat engendered by the case, there was no 
gladiator-style litigation. The cases were settled, together, by the 
defendants and the EEOC’s general counsel’s office about six months 
after they were filed, without significant litigation.
201
 Under the sexual 
harassment consent decree, PJAX agreed to pay $500,000; $300,000 in 
compensatory damages to the charging party and another $200,000 to be 
shared by four other claimants. In addition, the court order enjoined PJAX 
from subjecting female employees to an unlawful hostile work 
environment and required the company to revise its anti-discrimination 
policy to include a grievance process, confidential investigation 
procedures, and anti-retaliation provisions, and to provide anti-harassment 
equal employment training by an outside source to its employees.
202
 
The failure-to-hire decree involved more money and more injunctive 
relief. Under it, PJAX paid $2 million: $200,500 to one of the charging 
parties, a manager who complained he’d been fired in retaliation for 
protesting against discriminatory hiring practices; $25,000 to a charging 
party who complained she was refused employment because of her sex 
and age; and a total of $1.775 million to about 100 unnamed employees—
qualified females who applied for driver and/or dockworker positions over 
the three prior years but were rejected because of their sex, and qualified 
applicants for driver and dockworker positions in the same period who 
 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Interview with M. Jean Clickner, supra note 190. 
 200. Interview with Debra M. Lawrence, supra note 190. 
 201. The length of litigation puts PJAX at the sixteenth percentile on this measure; cf. Table 6.  
 202. Consent Decree, EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., 2:03-cv-00759-TFM-IJS (W.D. Pa., Nov. 20, 2003), 
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-PA-0133-0003.pdf. 
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were rejected because of their disabilities.
203
 In addition, PJAX agreed to 
give all class members priority hiring consideration.
204
  
The more general injunctive provisions of the decree were imposed for 
two years (a fairly typical length of time, as 71.6% of the decrees in our 
sample specified terms of 2 to 3 years), and required PJAX to reform its 
HR practices. First were the standard “thou shalt not” clauses:  
PJAX, its officers, agents, servants, employees and all persons 
acting or claiming to act in its behalf and interest hereby agree to 
comply with the provisions of Title VII and the ADEA and agree in 
this Decree to be enjoined, and are enjoined, from refusing to hire 
female applicants for employment because of their sex and/or age 
and from utilizing disparate qualifications for male and female 
applicants.
205
 
In addition, as per usual, the PJAX decree required anti-discrimination 
training for all employees who dealt with hiring, and the posting of anti-
discrimination policies at all its facilities and terminals nationwide.
206
  
The decree also required moderately detailed quarterly reporting to the 
EEOC on hiring activity. This too is extremely prevalent in EEOC 
decrees. The idea is presumably to (a) allow the EEOC to monitor whether 
the defendant is actually reforming, and (b) induce such reform by the in 
terrorem effect of the defendant’s awareness that it is being closely 
watched. For whatever reason, there was no post-decretal activity on either 
cases’ docket sheet. As discussed above, however, it would be difficult for 
the EEOC’s lawyers to devote enough time to this kind of follow-up to 
make it a strong tool. About 16% of the EEOC’s systemic cases are like 
Dial and McKesson, designating an outsider to serve as consultant or 
monitor. But in another 13% of its decrees, the EEOC seeks to deputize 
someone within a defendant organization who is likely to have both 
expertise and a commitment to the value the EEOC is trying to protect. 
Both sides agree that such deputation was a very important part of the 
PJAX case. Rather than itself engage in a collaboration with PJAX, and 
rather than designating a consultant, monitor, or workers to do so, the 
EEOC obtained agreement, by decree, that PJAX would create a “Human 
 
 
 203. Consent Decree at 3–5, EEOC v. PJAX, Inc., 1:03-cv-01535-JFM (D. Md., Nov. 24, 2003), 
available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-MD-0093-0002.pdf. 
 204. See id. at 7–9. 
 205. Id. at 9. 
 206. Id. at 12–13. 
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Resources Specialist” position and fill that role with someone who had “a 
professional background in the field of human resources.”207 As a mild 
check on its choice, PJAX was required to report to the EEOC the 
designated employee’s name and experience. It was then the HR 
specialist’s task to ensure compliance with equal opportunity laws at all 
facilities and terminals nationwide, to “promot[e] employment 
opportunities for females in the traditionally male jobs of driver and 
dockworker,” and to investigate complaints.208  
More particularly, the HR specialist was to be assigned a variety of 
tasks that would solidify and standardize recruitment and hiring process, 
including “development of defined, uniform, objective, job-related 
qualifications for the positions of driver and dockworker,” and “objective, 
defined, uniform, and published procedures for hiring.”209 In addition, the 
HR specialist would “implement[] defined and consistent job application, 
record-keeping, and records retention procedures, including the 
development and retention of applicant flow data.”210 These types of 
bureaucratization are prevalent remedies in the EEOC’s decrees; designed, 
of course, to minimize the opportunity for bias to operate and to facilitate 
both internal and external monitoring. Over three-quarters of the 
Commission’s decrees in systemic cases involving hiring or promotion 
include record-keeping provisions.  
It should be apparent, then, that the PJAX decree fails to conform to 
either the gladiator or collaboration theories. It demonstrates neither long-
term high stakes conflict nor much by way of ongoing and creative 
collaboration between either the EEOC or workers on the one hand and 
PJAX on the other. Instead, what seems to be going on—even more than 
in the McKesson case—is managerialism. And here, the priority given to 
standard management techniques (often unrelated to civil rights) is 
coupled with the designation of a particular manager, a human resources 
specialist, to carry out those techniques. The EEOC’s role is as a back-
stop; compliance reporting enabled EEOC intervention, but entirely at the 
EEOC’s discretion. No such intervention is evident in the record.  
We move, next, to more systematic analysis of the EEOC’s systemic 
docket.  
 
 
 207. Id. at 9. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 9–10. 
 210. Id. at 10. 
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IV. THE EEOC’S SYSTEMIC LITIGATION 
The three case studies discussed above illustrate the variety of types of 
injunctive relief obtained by the EEOC during our study period. One could 
find some support for aspects of both the gladiator and collaboration 
theories in the Dial and McKesson cases, while PJAX seemed largely 
consonant with managerialist theories. But what does the EEOC’s 
systemic docket as a whole reveal about the agency’s injunctive practices? 
In this Part, we undertake systematic analysis of a large sample of the 
EEOC’s systemic cases.  
The first step in a systematic analysis is identifying which of the 
EEOC’s cases are “systemic” cases. Unfortunately, during the period of 
our study—cases filed from October 1997 through September 2006—the 
EEOC did not itself clearly identify which of its cases it viewed as 
systemic.
211
 So in order to capture the cases most likely aimed at structural 
reform, we used seven criteria. Any case that met any one of these criteria 
was screened into the set of cases we call “systemic.” The first two criteria 
are legal theories that suggest a collective element—allegations of a 
pattern or practice of discrimination,
212
 or a disparate impact claim.
213
 The 
 
 
 211. The EEOC’s information management system did have a variable on “case type”—”I” for 
individual or “C” for class—that initially seemed promising. However, during the years of this study, 
the category C meant only that when a suit was filed, the EEOC’s lawyer thought it likely to benefit 
more than one charging party. This is clearly not a variable that captures the concept of “systemic” 
litigation. (We did, however, include every case labeled C in our sample.) 
 In subsequent years, as the EEOC has tried to ramp up its systemic docket, its categorization 
methodology has shifted. In 2007, the EEOC operationalized the category of “systemic” using multiple 
“indicia”: among them were “Commissioner charges,” “suit filings with 20+ victims,” and “suit 
resolutions with 20+ victims.” See EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY HIGHLIGHTS, FY 
2007, at 12, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/2007/highlights. 
pdf. Beginning in 2009 (under the new, Democratic administration), the EEOC began to report the 
number of systemic cases brought, evidencing firmer boundaries for categorization. See FY 2009 
Performance and Accountability Report Highlights, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/2009 
parhigh_discussion.cfm (last visited Aug. 21, 2014) (reporting nineteen new systemic cases filed). By 
2011, the Commission was counting a case as systemic more simply, if it has at least 20 known or 
expected class members. See FY 2011 Performance and Accountability Report Highlights, EEOC, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/2011parhigh_discussion.cfm (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). The report 
describes 261 lawsuits filed that year: “These included 177 individual suits, 61 multiple-victim suits 
(with fewer than 20 victims) and 23 systemic suits.” And it uses the same categories for the 443 cases 
remaining on the active docket: “116 (26 percent) involved multiple aggrieved parties (but fewer than 
20) and 63 (14 percent) involved challenges to systemic discrimination.” Id.  
 212. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-6(a) (2012). 
 213. Title VII doctrine encompasses both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of 
discrimination. In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff alleges that she suffered adverse treatment 
on the job and that that treatment was motivated by her race, sex or other protected characteristic. 
Disparate impact cases, by contrast, do not assume that discriminatory treatment was intentional. 
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next two criteria ask whether twenty or more individuals were potentially 
affected by the suit.
214
 The remaining three criteria focus on the breadth of 
the remedy obtained—namely, whether twenty or more complainants 
received monetary relief, whether the monetary relief totaled $1 million or 
more in real (2007) dollars, and whether the relief included an affirmative 
action remedy. The first two criteria show that broad relief for a workforce 
was likely obtained, while the presence of an affirmative action remedy 
again indicates a collective element to the suit.  
Using these criteria, we identified a set of 281, which we refer to as the 
EEOC’s “systemic cases.”215 Because our initial dataset was a stratified 
random sample of cases, we estimate that the total number of systemic 
cases brought by the EEOC over the ten-year period of our study was 
about 307, representing approximately 9% of the EEOC’s litigation 
caseload during that period.
216
 Table 1 lists the number of systemic cases 
in our sample by year and the percentage of those cases that satisfied each 
of our inclusion criteria.  
 
 
Rather, under a disparate impact theory, the plaintiff can show that the employer has adopted a facially 
neutral employment practice—for example, requiring a certain score on a standardized test—but that 
practice has a disproportionate impact on members of a protected group and is not justified by business 
necessity. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 576–78 (2009), for a discussion of the difference 
between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims under Title VII. Disparate impact cases are 
necessarily class-based rather than individual claims and are therefore systemic in nature. 
 214. We used both the EEOC’s internal estimates of the number of benefitted persons and our 
count of the number of complainants listed in the case documents. If either variable suggested that the 
case involving twenty or more individuals, we included it in the systemic cases. 
 215. These data are a subset of those collected in the EEOC Litigation Project. Our data selected 
and coded for that project are documented in PAULINE T. KIM, ANDREW D. MARTIN & MARGO 
SCHLANGER, EEOC LITIGATION DATABASE CODE BOOK (2013), available at http://eeoclitigation. 
wustl.edu/. All of the data collected in the EEOC Litigation Project are also available for download at 
that site. In brief, we began with a list of every case brought by the EEOC from October 1996 through 
September 2006. From this list, we selected a stratified random sample of cases for coding, excluding 
non-merits cases such as suits enforcing administrative subpoenas or administrative conciliations. We 
also excluded a handful of cases for a variety of reasons, such as unavailability of case documents or 
characteristics that did not fit our target population of EEOC suits against private defendants. In total, 
the Project coded information about 2,316 of the EEOC’s cases filed over a ten-year period of time. Of 
those, 281 met one or more of our criteria for inclusion in the set of “systemic” cases analyzed here.  
 216. Cases classified by the EEOC as intended to benefit more than one employee, all cases 
concluded by a contested court order, and all cases listing a trial date were included with probability 1. 
The remaining cases were randomly sampled with probability of .45 of being selected. See id. Nearly 
all of the systemic cases—261 of 281—came into our study with a probability of 1 based on the 
criteria we used for inclusion. The twenty other systemic cases represent only 2.3% of the part of the 
sample randomly selected for inclusion (with probability .45). The estimated number of non-selected 
cases in our target population is 1,109, and so an additional 26±10 (95% confidence interval) cases 
from the full list would have met our criteria for inclusion in the subset of systemic cases, if we had 
coded them all. Our sample of 281 thus represents the vast majority of the universe of systemic cases. 
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Our criteria cannot precisely identify those cases and only those cases 
targeting systemic discrimination; nevertheless, we believe the criteria 
sufficiently capture the cases we are interested in—those aimed at 
structural reform of a targeted workplace. To the extent that the EEOC 
pursued structural reform in its cases, we are most likely to see evidence of 
it in this subset of cases. 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES FILED 
FY 1997–2006 
Fiscal 
Year 
Filed 
Systemic 
Sample 
Percentage of cases in systemic sample satisfying each criteria: 
Pattern 
or 
Practice 
Disparate 
Impact 
20+ 
benefitted 
parties 
(EEOC 
data) 
20+ 
complainants 
listed in court 
docs 
20+ 
claimants 
awarded 
monetary 
damages 
$1 
million 
damages 
(EEOC 
data) 
Affirmative 
Action 
1997 19 37% 11% 53% 0% 26% 42% 5% 
1998 18 28% 11% 56% 0% 33% 61% 11% 
1999 23 48% 13% 17% 9% 4% 35% 9% 
2000 32 47% 13% 41% 9% 13% 22% 13% 
2001 34 38% 18% 38% 3% 21% 26% 6% 
2002 31 42% 13% 32% 6% 16% 39% 6% 
2003 39 56% 10% 36% 5% 18% 33% 8% 
2004 32 63% 13% 31% 3% 0% 22% 3% 
2005 28 61% 18% 21% 0% 7% 21% 7% 
2006 25 64% 12% 16% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Total 281 49% 13% 33% 4% 14% 29% 7% 
 
What are these systemic cases about? Figure A reports the proportion 
alleging different types of discrimination. As it illustrates, the most 
frequent basis of suit is sex (including pregnancy) discrimination, asserted 
in over half the cases. Race, national origin, or color discrimination 
claims, grouped together as “race” in the figure, are included in over a 
third of the systemic docket, as are retaliation claims. Age discrimination 
is less commonly alleged. And as might be expected, disability and 
religious discrimination—claims that are more often individual, rather 
than collective in nature—appear more rarely (and notably less frequently 
in the systemic docket than the non-systemic).
217
  
 
 
 217. In our non-systemic sample, 18% and 8% of the cases involve claims for disability or 
religious discrimination, respectively. 
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FIGURE A: BASIS OF SUIT, EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES FILED FY 1997–2006 
PROPORTION OF CASES ALLEGING EACH BASIS 
 
      *: “Race” includes race, national origin, and color. 
Figure B reports the proportion of systemic cases raising different types 
of employment issues. As is true of the EEOC’s docket as a whole, the 
cases most often deal with allegations of harassment and discharge. Next 
most frequent, but far less common, are claims alleging failure to hire or 
discriminatory working conditions, pay or promotion. 
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FIGURE B: ISSUES, EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES FILED FY 1997–2006 
PROPORTION OF CASES INVOLVING EACH ISSUE 
 
With this brief summary as context, we turn now to a systematic 
analysis of these cases. In addition to examining features of the litigation, 
we look at the terms of the injunctive remedies obtained by the EEOC in 
these cases, whether through settlement or contested court order.
218
  
Upon examination of the litigation characteristics of these cases and the 
type of injunctive terms obtained, we find little evidence that the EEOC’s 
systemic cases fit the gladiator theory’s depiction of structural reform 
litigation as hard-fought contests over liability with injunctive remedies 
requiring intense judicial engagement. Instead, these cases appear to 
involve fairly modest stakes, low-intensity litigation and, in most cases, 
minimal judicial oversight over decree implementation. Similarly, the 
cases do not match the collaborative theorists’ vision of contextually-
 
 
 218. Full documentation of the injunctive relief was not available in all cases, and default cases 
tend to involve defunct defendants, and are therefore omitted, so the discussion of the injunctive terms 
rests on an analysis of the 215 systemic cases resolved by settlement or court order in which we had 
access to the actual decree of orders.  
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sensitive, problem-solving collaborations. The injunctive relief obtained in 
these suits impose a fairly standardized set of remedies, most of which are 
peripheral to the firms’ core operations and fail to establish meaningful 
systems of accountability. Rather than seeking to fundamentally transform 
defendants’ operations, the remedies imposed reflect routinized, 
bureaucratic solutions—the kinds of “best practices” endorsed by human 
resources professionals and embraced by firms as a rational (if not 
necessarily effective) response to anti-discrimiantion mandates.  
A. Moderate-Size Cases 
Even when the EEOC appears to be pursuing systemic forms of 
discrimination, its cases were moderate in size. Tables 2 and 3 profile the 
EEOC’s systemic docket, by year, in terms of the number of persons 
compensated and the monetary awards obtained. 
TABLE 2: PERSONS COMPENSATED,*  
EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES FILED FY 1997–2006 
Filing 
year    N Mean 
      
Median 
   90        
%ile        Max 
 Total,  
 by year 
1997 10 41 21 127 163 410 
1998 9 79 56 351 351 707 
1999 8 9 7 23 23 71 
2000 14 34 5 56 330 475 
2001 21 13 8 28 33 268 
2002 19 24 8 52 224 448 
2003 26 25 6 67 216 646 
2004 17 7 4 17 18 115 
2005 16 219 3 29 3413 3502 
2006 9 18 2 138 138 163 
All 
years 
149 46 7 56 3413 6805 
       Among cases with documention of number of persons compensated 
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TABLE 3: MONETARY AWARD,* EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES FILED  
FY 1997–2006. REAL (2007) DOLLARS, IN THOUSANDS  
Filing 
year N Mean Median 90 %ile Max 
Total, by 
year 
1997 17 $1,537 $   957 $  3,235 $  7,631 $  26,125 
1998 18 $2,809 $1,238 $11,525 $12,256 $  50,558 
1999 19 $2,213 $   752 $  8,847 $11,266 $  42,053 
2000 31 $2,404 $   293 $  2,107 $54,158 $  74,535 
2001 29 $3,262 $   477 $  6,112 $59,260 $  94,589 
2002 27 $1,123 $   439 $  3,549 $  4,113 $  30,311 
2003 35 $   792 $   412 $  2,254 $  2,800 $  27,715 
2004 31 $   789 $   521 $  1,500 $  6,178 $  24,449 
2005 22 $4,463 $   219 $10,845 $50,153 $  98,186 
2006 16 $   275 $   113 $     800 $  1,800 $    4,406 
All 
years 
245 $1,930 $   425 $  3,188 $59,260 $472,926 
* Among cases with damages awarded (most data from document review; 
some from EEOC). 
Whether viewed in terms of the number of people benefitted or by the 
amount of money changing hands, the EEOC’s systemic cases are fairly 
modest. Total damages are not tiny, but neither are these bet-the-company 
cases. And while these cases are clearly about more than individual 
grievances, they do not generally appear to entail thorough-going reform 
of large-scale institutions—at least as measured by the number of 
employees benefitted.  
From this summary picture, it is difficult to know what explains the 
relatively modest size of these cases. It is possible that, given the changing 
nature of discrimination, more subtle forms of bias are less likely to 
generate blockbuster cases worth millions. Alternatively, private counsel 
specializing in employment discrimination class actions might be filing the 
big money class actions before the EEOC has the chance to act. The 
agency does have the power to intervene in privately filed employment 
discrimination suits, but it does not do so often, perhaps because it chooses 
instead to devote its resources to unrepresented parties. Whatever the 
explanation, the vast majority of the EEOC’s cases—even those that might 
be characterized as systemic—are quite modest in scope. 
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B. Low-Intensity Litigation 
In contrast to the early depiction of structural reform cases as hard-
fought contests, the EEOC’s systemic cases overwhelmingly involve low-
intensity litigation. As seen in Table 4, the vast majority of the systemic 
cases we examined—more than 87% of the resolved cases—ended by 
settlement.
219
 A mere handful—8% of resolved cases—ended through 
some sort of litigated judgment.
220
  
TABLE 4: TYPE OF RESOLUTION, SYSTEMIC EEOC CASES FILED  
FY 1997 TO 2006*  
 N % 
1. Settlement 229 87.4% 
2. Withdrawal by EEOC 3 1.1% 
3. Default judgment 9 3.4% 
4. Litigated Judgment for Def’t 8 3.1% 
5. Litigated Judgment for EEOC 13 5.0% 
Total 262   
* Among cases resolved by April 22, 2008, the date on which the data-gathering 
for this project ended. Nineteen of the 281 cases in the sample were ongoing as 
of that date. 
Of course a case can be the site of very intensive litigation and 
nonetheless end by settlement. That is hardly ever the case in this docket, 
however. Most of the EEOC’s systemic cases show little evidence of any 
rigorous contestation of liability. One hundred sixty-one, or 70.3% of the 
systemic cases that settled, were resolved without a single substantive 
motion being filed,
221
 and forty-three, or 19% of settled cases, were 
 
 
 219. We coded as the resolution in each case the event by which the EEOC’s complaint was 
completely resolved, at least initially, at the district court level. That is, if a judgment was entered, we 
considered that a resolution, regardless of subsequent appeal, settlement, or failure to comply. In some 
cases, as when a district court’s judgment was overturned on appeal, this event turned out not to be the 
end of the litigation in the district court. 
 220. Note, however, that for those few cases that do not settle, appeals are common: the EEOC 
filed notices of appeal in six of the eight cases in the sample in which it lost; defendants filed a notice 
of appeal in eight of the thirteen cases in which they lost.  
 221. By “substantive motions” we mean any motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), motions for judgment on the pleadings, motions for summary judgment and 
motions for judgment as a matter of law. 
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resolved before the defendant even filed an answer. Discovery motions
222
 
were somewhat more common than substantive motions, as seen in Table 
5. Even so, more than half the cases resolved without a discovery motion 
being filed. Judicial involvement in the typical cases did not appear to be 
particularly intense either. As seen in Table 5, the number of discovery 
and substantive motions actually ruled on by a judge before the settlement 
was quite modest across most of the cases. Only a very small handful of 
the settled cases appeared to entail the kind of intense, prolonged litigation 
battle predicted by the gladiator model. In the vast run of cases, resolution 
might have been preceded by a scheduling conference or two, and less 
commonly, a judicial ruling on a discovery motion or two. 
TABLE 5: SIGNIFICANT MOTIONS AND EVENTS IN EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES 
RESOLVED BY AGREEMENT (FILED FY 1997 TO 2006) (N = 229) 
 Mean Median 75 %ile 90 %ile Max 
1. Discovery Motions Filed 2.28 0 2 6 129 
2. Discovery Motions Resolved 1.81 0 1 5 110 
3. Substantive Motions Filed 0.86 0 1 2 26 
4. Substantive Motions Resolved 0.42 0 0 1 21 
5. Scheduling/Status Conference Held 1.90 1 2 5 30 
 
Other measures of litigation intensity, reported in Table 6, similarly 
suggest that the bulk of the systemic cases entailed low-intensity litigation: 
TABLE 6: FEATURES OF RESOLVED EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES,  
FY 1997–2006 
 N Mean 25th %ile Median 75th %ile 90 %ile Max 
1. Days to first resolution 262 562 300 507 806 1051 2378 
2. Decree pages 215 16 9 13 19 30 75 
        
 
The first row of Table 6 sets out the length of the pre-resolution 
litigation, which is often very modest. In fact, in about 6.5% of the 
systemic cases, resolution is reached in the first month after filing, often 
with joint resolutions proposed for court approval simultaneously with the 
 
 
 222. By “discovery motions” we mean motions about what information was subject to or 
protected from disclosure, such as motions to compel and motions for a protective order. We did not 
count motions relating solely to such matters as the timing of discovery. 
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court complaint. In such a situation, the court serves as a recorder and 
potential enforcer of the settlement, rather than a forum for dispute 
resolution. More typically, the litigation lasted between one and three 
years. The dockets do not show particularly intense conflict during that 
time, however, as Table 5 shows—an average of three motions are filed 
(two discovery and one substantive).  
In any event, resolution having been reached, the decrees that result are 
not the behemoths predicted by the gladiator theory. Rather, as Table 6’s 
row 2 sets out, they tend to be fairly short—sixteen pages is the mean, and 
75% have fewer than twenty pages. And their length of time is also quite 
short. The vast majority of them impose remedial terms for a defined 
period of time—a term of months specified at the outset of the decree 
stage. Nearly 72% of the decrees specified a term of 2 to 3 years. 
Of course, litigation does not necessarily end with the entry of a 
judgment.
223
 In structural reform cases, the implementation phase may 
entail vigorous contestation. And even when a time limit is specified in a 
civil rights injunctive case, such a limit might be extended if the defendant 
has not complied prior to the scheduled end date.
224
 Among the EEOC’s 
resolved systemic cases, however, only a handful define the decree’s 
duration in substantive terms—and often these provide for early 
termination if particular events occur (e.g., if ownership of the company is 
transferred,
225
 or a facility is closed
226
). In just two of the decrees does 
 
 
 223. In all sorts of institutional reform litigation, experience teaches that the most crucial work 
may take place after the decree is entered. See, e.g., PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES: 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS (1988); M. KAY HARRIS & 
DUDLEY P. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL 
SETTINGS (1977); Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform 
Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725. As Lloyd Anderson wrote in a study of the implementation phase 
in structural reform cases, “Approval of the consent decree . . . is just the beginning of a new and 
crucial phase of the case, that of implementing the promises in the decree.” Id. at 727. See also Selmi, 
Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1330 (“[W]hen employment discrimination cases were 
treated as involving public rather than purely private interests . . . the filing of the settlement 
agreement often marked the beginning of the proceedings rather than the end, as these attorneys 
carefully reviewed the defendants’ progress to ensure that the terms of the agreement were being 
fulfilled.”). 
 224. See, e.g., Consent Decree at 10–11, EEOC v. Pinnacle Nissan, Inc., CIV 00-1872-PHX-
MHM (D. Ariz. Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://chadmin.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/EE-
AZ-0085-0004.pdf; EEOC v. Milgard Mfg. Inc., No. 01-MK-1731 (OES) (D. Colo., filed Aug. 31, 
2001) (documenting several extensions to the decree) (Documents and information about the case 
available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 
8450).  
 225. See EEOC v. Sbarros Italian Eatery, 2:00-cv-00774-DB (D. Utah, filed Sept. 29, 2000) 
(documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www. 
clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9187). 
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termination depend on the defendant achieving some measure of reform.
227
 
Nor do the docket sheets show evidence of massive implementation 
struggles. Only in three or four of the cases do the docket sheets reflect 
any post-decretal injunction-related activity.
228
 Thus signs of post-decree 
implementation struggle are nearly non-existent. Of course much 
implementation work may be done without any record making it into a 
court file, but one would expect major disputes to leave their mark on 
docket sheets.  
In short, contrary to the gladiator theory’s depiction of structural 
reform litiation as hard-fought battles over liability and remedial terms, the 
EEOC’s systemic cases during the period of our study are best 
characterized as modest-sized, low-intensity disputes that were resolved 
without epic struggles.  
 
 
 226. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., No. 1:03-cv-01663-ZLW-PAC (D. Colo., 
filed Aug. 29, 2003) (documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8387).  
 227. See Consent Decree at 8–9, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 3:04-cv-04731-
SI (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-CA-0006-
0023.pdf (additional documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=7903); Consent Decree at 11, EEOC v. 
Eagle Financial, Inc., No. 8:97-cv-03274-AW (D. Md. Apr. 14, 2000), available at 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/EE-MD-0030-0001.pdf (“This Consent Decree shall 
continue in effect . . . until the earlier of A. Two years from the entry of this Decree; or B. Until the 
number of African-American individuals employed by Eagle at any given moment is within one 
standard deviation, at a confidence level of 95%, of the number of African-American individuals 
expected to be employed based on the most recent decennial census data available for the job category 
of Teller, plus an additional twelve months; so long as that at the expiration of the additional 12 
months the number of African-American individuals employed by Eagle remains within two standard 
deviations.”) (additional documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=7903).  
 228. In Milgard Mfg. Inc., there were four decree extensions, from three to five years, because of 
compliance issues. See Case Profile: EEOC v. Milgard Manufacturing Incorporated dba Milgard 
Windows, THE CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php? 
id=8450. In EEOC v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., No. 3:99-CV-50362 (N.D. Ill, filed Nov. 3, 1999) 
(documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.clearinghouse. net/detail.php?id=8978), apparent enforcement struggles were ended by the 
defendants’ bankruptcy. In EEOC v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Texas and EEOC v. STI Holdings, 
Inc., there were efforts to enforce or extend the decree. See EEOC v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of 
Tex., No. 5:99-CV-01088-ECP (W.D. Tex., filed Sept. 30, 1999) (documents and information 
available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id= 
9390); EEOC v. STI Holdings, Inc., No. 03-C-0543-S (W.D. Wis., filed Sept. 30, 2003) (documents 
and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse. 
net/detail.php?id=8764).Other cases do exhibit non-substantive post-decretal activity, such as 
notification to the court about distribution of monetary awards, attorneys’ fees motions, etc. 
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C. Standardized Terms 
Focusing on the injunctive terms obtained by the EEOC in its systemic 
cases, we found that the consent decrees and court orders imposed a fairly 
standardized set of terms, including simple, rule-based prohibitions of 
discrimination. Moreover, the standard remedies were hardly directed at 
transforming the structure of the workplace; instead they tended to 
emphasize peripheral remedies or impose procedural requirements rather 
than altering the firm’s core functions. This pattern does not match the 
expectations of the collaboration theory. A true problem-solving approach 
would result in a wide variety of injunctive relief provisions across cases, 
with the specifics in each case tailored to the unique circumstances of that 
particular employer. Nor do the observed remedies comport with the 
collaboration theory’s skepticism of traditional rule-based remedies that 
narrowly define compliance “as the absence of identifiable conduct 
violating those rules,”229 or its call for “functionally integrated” 
remedies
230
 that link the processes for pursuing anti-discrimination goals 
with the employer’s core productive and personnel activities. Far from 
developing contextually-based remedies in which firms are incentivized to 
problem-solve,
231
 we primarily observed the often boilerplate repetition of 
a stock set of injunctive terms. 
As Table 7 indicates, the most commonly obtained injunctive provision 
is the simple “thou shalt not” command—an order prohibiting the 
defendant from engaging in unlawful discrimination (row 1a, 88%). Only 
slightly less common is an order prohibiting retaliation against employees 
who complain about unlawful discrimination (row 1b, 81%). These orders 
take the form of the traditional rule-enforcement remedy as a rigid and 
externally defined prohibition. 
 
 
 229. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 475; see also Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 145 (seeking to hold employers responsible for “organizational 
choices, institutional practices, and workplace dynamics that enable the operation of discriminatory 
bias”). 
 230. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 519. 
 231. Id.; see also Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 144 (arguing 
that the “complex, contextual nature” of structural employment discrimination requires an “innovative, 
problem-based, collaborative solution” that does not fit with traditional remedies). 
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TABLE 7: TYPES OF REMEDIES IN EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES 
(N=215) 
Type of remedy N % 
1. Rule Enforcement Remedies    
a. Defendant prohibited from discriminating 189 88% 
b. Defendant prohibited from retaliating 174 81% 
c. Other requirements 30 14% 
2. Peripheral Remedies     
a. Require EEO training 188 87% 
b. Post notice of equal employment rights 184 86% 
c. Distribute notice of equal employment rights 105 49% 
d. Develop/modify anti-discrimination policy 72 33% 
e. Implement complaint/dispute resolution process 68 32% 
3. Procedural Remedies     
a. Advertising/recruitment requirements 34 16% 
b. Require objective hiring/promotion criteria 30 14% 
c. Require recruitment, hiring or promotion protocols 30 14% 
d. Require objective job descriptions 12 6% 
4. Outcome Focused Remedy   
a. Quantitative goals specified 20 9% 
 
A significant minority of the cases imposed other types of rule-
enforcement requirements on employers (row 1c, 14%). However, 
although some were context-specific, they generally were not the type of 
flexible, problem-solving remedy called for by the collaboration theory. In 
many cases, the orders are merely specific applications of general anti-
discrimination principles—for example, an order that forbids harassment 
of African-American employees.
232
 Others respond to the unique facts of a 
case, such as orders requiring that certain named individuals be fired, or 
not be re-hired,
233
 or, in one case, an order prohibiting a firm from 
sponsoring company events at “adult entertainment establishments.”234 In 
 
 
 232. See EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (documents and 
information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse. net/ 
detail.php?id=9454). 
 233. See, e.g., EEOC v. Lockheed Martin, No. 1:05-cv-00479-SPK-LEK, 2007 WL 4468658 (D. 
Haw. Dec. 18, 2007) (documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=6096); EEOC v. Midamerica Hotels 
Corp., No. 4:03-CV-00107-HEA, 2004 WL 758054 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 2004) (documents and 
information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse. 
net/detail.php?id=8411). 
 234. Modified Injunction Order at 4, EEOC v. Custom Companies, Inc., No. 1:02-cv-03768, 2007 
WL 1810495 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2007) (documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS 
LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=7999). 
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another case, the injunctive remedy required the defendant employer, a 
private school, to offer tuition waivers for the complainants’ enrolled 
children.
235
 Such a remedy, while certainly creative and context-specific, 
does not seek to address structural sources of second-generation 
discrimination. 
If a collaborative approach is taken to addressing second-generation 
discrimination, one would expect to see injunctive terms that affect the 
core decision-processes of the firm. Thus, rather than seeking to eliminate 
a discrete, identifiable discriminatory practice, such an approach will link 
these normative concerns to the firm’s core business or personnel practices 
in order to reform those structures and processes which allow bias to 
operate.
236
 An example of a functionally integrated remedy would be the 
ongoing collection of demographic data to identify and correct problems 
of underrepresentation in certain job categories and to hold managers 
accountable for their personnel decisions.
237
 Other examples would require 
reconfiguring job ladders or skill tests. By contrast, “peripheral remedies” 
do not require any changes in how the employer carries on its usual 
business operations—for example, requiring its employees to undergo 
EEO training—and procedural remedies, while requiring behavior 
changes, do not necessarily alter the core decision-making processes of the 
firm.  
As seen in Table 7, peripheral remedies were the type most frequently 
deployed after rule enforcement remedies. Aside from the traditional “thou 
shalt not” injunctions discussed above, the most common remedies 
ordered were a requirement that the employer provide EEO training to its 
employees (row 2a, 87%) and that it post a notice informing employees of 
their rights under equal employment laws (row 2b, 86%). Far less 
common—though potentially important, as we argue below—were 
remedies imposing certain procedures on a firms’ personnel practices, 
such as a requirement that objective criteria be used for hiring and 
promotion (row 3.b, 14%), or that job openings be publicized in ways 
designed to reach all potentially qualified applicants (row 3.a, 16%). 
Of course, not all types of remedies are appropriate in all cases. For 
example, requiring objective promotion criteria might be warranted in a 
 
 
 235. EEOC v. Univ. of the Incarnate Word, No. 5:99-cv-01090-OLG (W.D. Tex., filed Sept. 30, 
1999) (documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8413). 
 236. See Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 148. 
 237. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 516–17. 
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case alleging a discriminatory failure to promote, but not in a case 
involving only charges of sexual harassment. However, the very idea of 
structural reform is premised on the theory that discriminatory outcomes 
are not isolated, one-off incidents, but occur because the overarching 
structure of work permits bias to operate in an organization.
238
 Thus, 
sexual harassment should not be viewed as the result of one bad actor, but 
a system in which women workers are isolated tokens, or alternatively, 
lack power within the organization.
239
 To the extent that the remedies 
obtained by the EEOC are narrowly tailored to address only the specific 
legal issues alleged, they are inconsistent with a structural approach to 
addressing second generation forms of discrimination.
240
  
In addition to coding for the most commonly occurring forms of 
injunctive relief obtained by the EEOC, we also captured information 
about other “miscellaneous” types of relief. Review of these additional 
provisions revealed little in the way of functionally integrated remedies. 
Most simply entailed more detailed instructions regarding how the 
standard set of remedies should be carried out. For example, one decree 
required that the posted notice of employees’ rights should state where the 
closest EEOC office is located and explain that complaints could be filed 
there.
241
 Another required the employer to provide the EEO notices on 
employees’ paychecks, along with contact information for reporting 
violations.
242
  
The one notable exception is a group of cases—fewer than 20—that 
included provisions requiring the employer to integrate consideration of 
managers’ compliance efforts in their performance evaluations. Typical of 
these provisions were requirements that a defendant “revise its 
performance evaluation forms for managers and supervisors in order to 
include measures for performance compliance with [its] discrimination, 
 
 
 238. See Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 149. 
 239. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 477. 
 240. This point is emphasized by ARIANE HEGEWISCH, CYNTHIA DEITCH, & EVELYN MURPHY, 
ENDING SEX AND RACE DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: LEGAL INTERVENTIONS THAT PUSH 
THE ENVELOPE (2011), available at http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/ending-sex-and-race-
discrimination-in-theworkplace-legal-interventions-that-push-the-envelope-1. 
 241. EEOC v. Arrowhead Bagel Co., 2:00-cv-01860-SMM (D. Ariz., filed Sept. 28, 2000) 
(documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www. 
clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9000). 
 242. Consent Decree at 6, EEOC v. Midamerica Hotels Corp., 4:03-CV-00107-HEA, 2004 WL 
758054 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 6, 2004), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/ EE-
MO-0054-0006.pdf. 
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harassment and retaliation policies and procedures,”243 or impose 
substantial discipline “upon any supervisor or manager who engages in 
sex discrimination or permits any such conduct to occur.”244 In cases in 
which quantitative goals were specified, however, achievement of or 
progress towards those quantitative goals was not required to be part of 
managers’ performance evaluations. Thus, even when injunctive terms 
attempted to incorporate anti-discrimination goals into the job 
responsibilities of critical decision-makers in the workplace, those goals 
were usually broadly and negatively defined.  
To summarize, the EEOC’s remedies are quite standardized in their 
terms. There is little sign of the kinds of flexible, contextualized remedial 
design highlighted in collaborationist accounts. Most common are simple, 
rule-based prohibitions of discrimination, requirements for EEO training, 
and notice to employees of their anti-discrimination rights. Although the 
efficacy of these types of remedies is not our focus here, it is worth 
pointing out that social science evidence increasingly suggests that these 
are unlikely to be effective remedies for workplace discrimination, and 
may even decrease integration or increase bias.
245
  
 
 
 243. Consent Decree at 8, EEOC v. Valentino Las Vegas, LLC, No. 2:04-cv-01357-JCM-LRL (D. 
Nev., Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/EE-NV-0042-
0002.pdf (additional documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8747).  
 244. Consent Decree at 8–9, EEOC v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-00503-RSL (W.D. 
Wash., June 1, 2004), available at http://chadmin.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/EE-WA-0098-
0002.pdf (additional documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8962). 
 245. See, e.g., Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., Presumed Fair: Ironic Effects of Organizational Diversity 
Structures, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 504 (2013) (presence of a diversity program 
induced experimental subjects to discount evidence of discrimination); Lisa Legault, Jennifer N. 
Gutsell & Michael Inzlicht, Ironic Effects of Antiprejudice Messages: How Motivational Interventions 
Can Reduce (but Also Increase) Prejudice, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1472 (2011) (priming experimental 
subjects by highlighting external anti-discrimination norms increased tested bias); Elizabeth Levy 
Paluck & Donald P. Green, Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A Review and Assessment of Research 
and Practice, 60 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 339 (2009) (analyzing 985 studies but finding no solid 
evidence that training reduces bias); Frank Dobbin, Daniel Schrage & Alexandra Kalev, Do 
Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity Work? Evidence from Private-Sector Workplaces tbl. 2 
(2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (finding negative effect on managerial 
integration from existence of grievance procedures); Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, You Can’t 
Make Me: Resistance to Corporate Diversity Training (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
authors) (concluding that training programs that focus on legal compliance appear to result in declines 
in management diversity). 
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D. Limited Mechanisms of Accountability 
Critical to any effective structural reform remedy is a method of 
ensuring that the defendant is accountable for its compliance with public 
norms. One important component of accountability is the generation and 
sharing of data about matters such as the gender and racial composition of 
hiring pools and different job classifications, the effects of different 
personnel practices, and the incidence of complaints by employees.
246
 
Such data is necessary not only to identify problems; they also make it 
possible to hold firms accountable for implementing meaningful changes. 
In addition, accountability likely requires the on-going involvement of the 
court or third parties empowered to identify problems and ensure 
compliance with the decree terms. Although the EEOC’s systemic cases 
often required firms to generate data about their operations, the limited use 
of effective monitors raises doubts about the extent to which firms were 
meaningfully held accountable for structural change. 
In a substantial proportion of the cases in our sample, the injunctive 
remedies included provisions generating data about the firm’s operations. 
As seen in Table 8, most commonly included was a provision that required 
a defendant to report on its compliance with the injunctive terms. Because 
many of the provisions involved peripheral remedies like posting a notice 
of rights or conducting training, some of this compliance reporting had 
little to do with a firm’s core operations. However, in a majority of cases 
(row 2, 56%), some sort of record-keeping, often more directly tied to 
business operations or personnel practices, was required—for example, 
maintaining records of complaints, the race of applicants, or the outcomes 
of promotion decisions. Also included in a majority of cases (row 3, 55%) 
was a requirement that employers report complaints received about 
discrimination or harassment. Less common were provisions of specific 
forms of audit or regular reports on whether quantitative goals were 
achieved. 
 
 
 246. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 519–20; Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics, supra note 18, at 155. 
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TABLE 8: REMEDIES INVOLVING DATA GENERATION  
IN EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES  
(N=215) 
Type of remedy N % 
1. Compliance reporting  180 84% 
2. Record-keeping  121 56% 
3. Reports on complaints/incidents  118 55% 
4. Auditing  15 7% 
5. Quantitative Goals Specified 20 9% 
a. Outcomes required to be reported 10  
b. Outcomes assessed against goals 5  
 
In a significant proportion of cases, then, the injunctive relief included 
requirements that a firm generate data about its practices, although the 
type of data most often produced was information about complaints and 
reported incidents of discrimination or harassment. To that extent, the data 
generated lends itself more readily to detecting and addressing potential 
rule violations rather than to diagnosing structural conditions that enable 
bias to operate or to engaging in proactive problem-solving.  
Finding evidence of “systems of accountability” imposed by the 
injunctive terms in our sample is difficult. The characteristics most closely 
capturing accountability are whether quantitative goals are specified and 
whether the duration of a consent decree is measured not in months, but in 
terms of the achievement of substantive goals. As seen in Table 9, 
relatively few cases incorporated terms of these sorts (9% and 5% 
respectively, in rows 2 and 1). The other types of compliance measures 
identified (10%, row 3) mostly involved setting time deadlines for 
performing acts required under the decree, such as making payment to 
individual complainants, giving notice of the action, posting a notice of 
rights, or conducting training sessions. Thus, they set out measures of 
accountability for performing specific acts required by the injunction, 
rather than accountability for the ways in which the firms’ structures or 
processes might enable discriminatory bias to operate. 
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TABLE 9: REMEDIES INVOLVING ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES  
IN EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES (N=215) 
Type of remedy N % 
1. Duration of decree specified in non-time terms 10 5% 
2. Quantitative goals and timetables specified 20 9% 
3. Other measures of compliance specified 22 10% 
TABLE 10: REMEDIES INVOLVING ACCOUNTABILITY TO STAKEHOLDERS 
AND INTERMEDIARIES IN EEOC SYSTEMIC CASES (N=215) 
 
Any 
Stakeholder 
Role 
Requiring 
Complaint/ 
Incident Report 
to Stakeholders 
Requiring 
Compliance 
Reports to 
Stakeholders 
Requiring 
Stakeholder 
Access for 
Monitoring 
Other Roles 
for 
Stakeholders 
Specified 
1. Any Stakeholder Access    205 115 178 123 53 
2. Internal Stakeholders      
a. Internal Manager 33 1 2 3 27 
b. Peer Worker Group 1 0 0 0 1 
c. Union 0 0 0 0 0 
3. External Stakeholders      
a. EEOC 201 113 178 108 3 
b. Private Plaintiff or 
Counsel  
7 3 6 1 0 
c. Consultant 26 2 4 12 18 
d. Monitor/Special Master       9 2 1 3 8 
e. Advocacy Group 1 0 1 0 0 
 
Any successful system of accountability not only requires the 
production of information, but must empower individuals or entities to 
receive and respond to that information. As discussed above, early theories 
of structural reform litigation emphasized the on-going role of the judge in 
ensuring adherence to anti-discrimination norms. Collaboration theorists, 
by contrast, suggest a crucial role for intermediaries—individuals and 
nongovernmental organizations who can “translat[e] and mediat[e] 
between formal law and workplace practice.”247 Estlund similarly 
emphasizes the role of intermediaries in assessing the efficacy of labor 
standards. She argues that the critical elements of an effective system of 
workplace self-regulation are “independent outside monitoring and some 
form of effective employee participation.”248 
 
 
 247. See Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 523. 
 248. See Estlund, Rebuilding the Law, supra note 59, at 325. 
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Examining the decrees in our sample reveals modest efforts to 
empower external intermediaries. In roughly 16% of the cases, appointed 
monitors or outside consultants who specialize in EEO matters are given 
some role in implementing the remedial terms. (Tbl. 10, rows 3c and d) In 
a similar proportion of the cases, an internal manager at the firm was given 
some responsibility or authority regarding decree implementation. (row 
2a) 
What is notably absent, however, is any attempt to empower workers, 
either through a union or a more informally created group. In only one 
case out of 215 did we see any effort to involve workers in the problem-
solving
249
 and in none was any role created for a union in monitoring the 
terms of a consent decree or participating in restructuring processes within 
the firm. (Tbl. 10, rows 2b and c) Unfortunately, we lack information 
about base rates—we do not know in how many cases a union was present 
at the workplace that might have been called on to ensure accountability. 
And the labor laws’ hostility to employer-created worker organizations250 
might well have discouraged other efforts to involve employees in 
problem-solving. Still, the nearly complete lack of any provisions calling 
for accountability to line-employees, the ultimate stakeholders in cases 
involving discrimination and harassment, is notable.
251
 
Although neither outsiders nor stakeholders within the defendant firms 
are consistently given monitoring or enforcement powers, the decrees 
do—overwhelmingly—create some on-going role for the EEOC. In nearly 
all cases—201 out of 215—the defendant is obligated to report to the 
EEOC or submit to monitoring by it. (Tbl. 10, row 3a) Thus, of all the 
potential monitors and stakeholders, the EEOC is the principal entity 
 
 
 249. See EEOC v. Rainbow Rest. Props., Inc., No. 0:06-cv-00988-PJS-JJG (D. Minn., filed Mar. 
7, 2006) (documents and information available at CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8368). The case involved allegations of discriminatory 
harassment against Hispanic and Latino workers by the employer, a restaurant. Among other things, 
the consent decree called for the creation of an employee advisory committee, composed “of at least 
one-half Hispanic or Latino . . . employees to review and present feedback to [defendant] regarding its 
marketing and advertising efforts.” Proposed Consent Decree at 5, EEOC v. Rainbow Rest. Props, Inc., 
No. 0:06-CV-0098-PJS-JJG (D. Minn. Apr. 27, 2007). The consent decree does not make clear 
whether the “marketing and advertising efforts” referred to are in regards to hiring and promotion or 
the restaurant’s services, nor does it provide any other details regarding the role or composition of the 
employee advisory committee.  
 250. See Estlund, Rebuilding the Law, supra note 59, at 362–63; see also id. at 363 n.199 
(documenting the scholarly discussion). 
 251. Cf. id. at 333 (arguing that the regulatory model renders employees the passive beneficiaries 
of the government’s protection).  
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empowered with information and rights of access that might be leveraged 
to hold firms accountable for engaging in meaningful reform.  
The decrees alone do not tell us if or how the EEOC exercises the 
powers it thus acquires through its consent decrees, but the agency appears 
to have the capacity to engage in meaningful monitoring. Our data suggest 
that there are about seventy systemic decrees open at any given time; that 
amounts to fewer than two dozen reports per month, spread out among all 
the EEOC’s attorneys. However, neither our case studies nor the systemic 
docket as a whole shows evidence of vigorous monitoring activity by the 
EEOC. Recall that in Dial and McKesson, where the EEOC’s attorneys 
felt there was a need for close monitoring, they negotiated the hiring of 
outside consultants to oversee implementation.
252
 In the more typical cases 
like PJAX, reports to the EEOC are required, but the case documents and 
dockets do not indicate any post-decretal activity.
253
 While it is possible 
EEOC lawyers spent time analyzing and following up on these reports, our 
interviews suggest that post-decree monitoring was not a priority for the 
agency.
254
 In addition, perhaps we see little evidence of ongoing 
monitoring because the most common remedies—such as posting notices 
and conducting training—are easy for firms to comply with and 
compliance is readily verifiable. 
To summarize, the decrees in the systemic cases show some efforts 
toward holding firms accountable, primarily in the form of generating 
information about on-going complaints. Nevertheless, they largely appear 
to neglect an important aspect of ensuring accountability—namely, 
empowering stakeholders within the firm or appointing outsiders who are 
able to engage in effective monitoring. 
E. Enforced Managerialism 
Our study suggests that the EEOC’s injunctive practices in these cases 
are part of a larger phenomenon, namely, the widespread adoption of 
routinized bureaucratic responses to the legal prohibition on employment 
discrimination. As discussed in Part I.C., supra, a rich sociological 
literature has explored how firms have constructed civil rights law, 
 
 
 252. See supra Part III.A (discussing decree and monitoring for Dial), and Part III.B (discussing 
decree and monitoring for McKesson).  
 253. See supra Part III.C (discussing PJAX’s creation of a “Human Resources Specialist” instead 
of engaging an outside monitor for post-decree monitoring activities). 
 254. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 138–46, 183. 
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infusing it with managerial values as they internalized its commands. The 
result has been the development and diffusion of a number of standard 
responses, adopted by firms to signal compliance and reduce liability 
risks.
255
 Although the sociological literature focuses on firms’ voluntary 
responses to general legal mandates, rather than particularized litigation, 
our study suggests that the EEOC has played a role through its systemic 
injunctive litigation in ratifying those responses and in promoting their 
adoption. 
In our analysis, the injunctive terms obtained in the EEOC’s systemic 
cases largely mirror the bureaucratic practices recommended by human 
resources professionals to comply with anti-discrimination law in non-
litigation contexts. Several of the most common decree terms we 
observed—the prohibition on discrimination and retaliation and the 
posting requirements—simply reassert the anti-discrimination mandate 
and provide notice of those rules to workers (although they also 
substantially ease the path of further enforcement, if further enforcement is 
needed). However, the other common terms, such as requiring EEO 
training, developing an anti-discrimination policy, and implementing a 
complaint or grievance process, are precisely the types of responses 
developed and spread by human resources professionals.
256
 Even the less 
commonly imposed remedies in our study, such as requiring the posting of 
available positions or the development of objective hiring or promotion 
criteria, are bureaucratic measures widely accepted as constituting human 
resources “best practices.”257 
The terms of the EEOC’s systemic cases are thus similar to those 
criticized by Selmi as demonstrating limited ambition to change employer 
practices or remedy past discrimination. Selmi’s theory is that more 
meaningful structural reform has fallen by the wayside as profit-motivated 
private attorneys, focusing on monetary damages, have been willing to 
settle for anemic forms of injunctive relief.
258
 EEOC lawyers, however, are 
 
 
 255. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text. 
 256. See generally, e.g., Dobbin & Kelly, How to Stop Harassment, supra note 76 (explaining 
spread of grievance procedures and training as responses to sexual harassment law); Edelman et al., 
Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 21 (describing development of grievance procedures as a 
response to anti-discrimination law); Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Origins and Effects of 
Corporate Diversity Programs, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF DIVERSITY AND WORK 253 (2013) 
[hereinafter Dobbin & Kalev, Origins]. 
 257. See generally DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22 at 101–32, 220–33 
((discussing development of bureaucratic personnel practices relating to hiring and promotion). 
 258. Selmi, Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1298–99. The EEOC’s lawyers confirm this 
account in large part—they report that intervenors’ counsel are generally pretty uninterested in 
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unlikely to be driven to the same extent by pocketbook incentives, given 
that their pay and other work benefits are not contingent on the amount of 
money damages recovered.
 259
 (Other incentives may, of course, encourage 
EEOC employees to seek high damages,
260
 but they are likely softer than 
in the private sector.) Moreover, as discussed in Part II, supra, the EEOC 
professes to prioritize systemic cases, seeing itself as “uniquely 
positioned” to focus on injunctive, rather than monetary, relief.261 If the 
EEOC is less likely distracted by financial incentives, what then explains 
its embrace of managerialist remedies? 
It is worth noting that in some ways, what we observe is nothing new. 
In the 1970s when it was first authorized to sue employers, the EEOC 
pursued consent agreements with a number of large employers that 
required them to adopt “best practices” recommended by personnel 
experts at the time.
262
 For example, a consent decree with AT&T required 
revised salary classifications and the use of validated job tests, while other 
companies agreed to change their seniority systems and to actively recruit 
women and minorities—all practices endorsed by personnel experts at the 
time.
263
 Thus, the EEOC’s emphasis on widely accepted human resources 
practices, which we observe in a more recent period, is continuous in some 
ways with its past injunctive efforts. 
Yet if the turn to human resources practices is nothing new, the 
particulars of the injunctive remedies obtained by the EEOC during our 
study period differ from those it sought in the 1970s; remedies during the 
more recent period are far more limited. The reasons, we suspect, are to be 
found both in and out of the courts. The more aggressive remedies of an 
earlier era—requiring job tests to be validated, restructuring job ladders, 
and the like—followed Supreme Court decisions such as Griggs v. Duke 
Power Company
264
 and Albemarle Paper
265
 that defined discrimination 
 
 
injunctive relief. See, e.g., Interview with Anna Park, supra note 183 (“If [intervenors’ counsel] have 
ongoing monitoring, and [the defendants] are paying them, they’re more interested, but for the most 
part, intervenors are not so interested in injunctive cases.”); Interview with Dana Johnson, supra note 
173 (“My perception is that the EEOC is much more interested in getting ongoing injunctive relief 
than the private bar, for obvious market-driven reasons.”). 
 259. See, e.g., Interview with Dana Johnson, supra note 173.  
 260. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement: Innovation 
and Optimal Punishment, with Antitrust Applications, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853 (2014) (arguing that 
public agencies have self-interested reasons for seeking to maximize financial recoveries through 
litigation). 
 261. EEOC, SYSTEMIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. 
 262. See DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 102–03. 
 263. See id. at 103. 
 264. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that Title VII prohibited intelligence testing or high school 
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expansively. These decisions suggested that anti-discrimination statutes 
barred more than animus, and that many previously accepted employer 
practices could constitute actionable discrimination. The courts have, in 
more recent years, been far more skeptical of this kind of reasoning,
266
 
necessarily reducing the ability of plaintiffs’ lawyers to obtain expansive 
remedies through litigation, including by negotiation. Moreover, 
especially after the Supreme Court in Faragher and Ellerth ratified anti-
harassment policies and grievance procedures as harassment prevention 
tools,
267
 it makes sense that both personnel experts and legal actors 
increasingly promoted these less intrusive procedures as a means of legal 
compliance. Outside the courts, as Dobbin, Edelman, and others have 
documented, organizational responses to Title VII and other anti-
discrimination laws likewise shifted, as professionals promoted new 
practices and in turn influenced doctrinal developments.
268
  
As times and the law have changed, it is unsurprising that the EEOC 
has continued to look to human resources “best practices” when shaping 
its decrees, because both the agency and personnel professionals were 
responding to the same challenges. The mandate of the law is clear—do 
not discriminate—but Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes offer 
no concrete guidance as to what constitutes compliance.
269
 In the face of 
legal ambiguity, firms are motivated to adopt structures or practices that 
visibly signal compliance with the law.
270
 As Dobbin and Kelly explain 
about the widespread acceptance of anti-harassment training programs, the 
personnel profession “had a plausible compliance remedy that offered 
executives a formalized solution, and judges a bright-line standard by 
which they could assess employers.”271 And once the Court signaled its 
 
 
completion requirements when they had the effect of disqualifying blacks at a disproportionately high 
rate without demonstrable connection to job performance). 
 265. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (finding discrimination in 
preemployment screening with disparate impact on black applicants that was not substantially related 
to job performance). 
 266. See Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 20, at 21–24; Robert L. Nelson, Ellen C. Berrey 
& Laura Beth Nielsen, Divergent Paths: Conflicting Conceptions of Employment Discrimination in 
Law and the Social Sciences, 4 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 103, 104–07 (2008).  
 267. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 268. See generally DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 220–32; see also, 
e.g., Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 21.  
 269. See Edelman, Legal Ambiguity, supra note 22, at 1537. 
 270. Id. at 1542. 
 271. Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 76, at 1237. 
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acceptance of these structures as a sign of compliance,
272
 companies had 
all the more reason to adopt them. As one employer-side lawyer explained, 
“The beauty of these rulings is that companies now know what they have 
to do: They have to advertise a no-harassment policy, run training 
programs and have a discipline-response mechanism. If the company does 
those things, they can defend against these cases.”273 Similarly, when 
pursuing systemic cases, the EEOC needed concrete remedies it could 
impose that would manifest firms’ compliance with the law. The “best 
practices” adopted by leading organizations and promoted by personnel 
professionals offered a solution—plausible forms of compliance that are 
visible and readily verifiable.  
An additional plausible reason the EEOC has repeatedly drawn on 
bureaucratic solutions to enforcement problems is that the Commission is 
itself a large bureaucratic organization. Managerialist remedies may 
appear familiar to its lawyers from the EEOC’s own employment 
practices, and in any event such remedies meet the agency’s need to 
rationalize and standardize its core function of enforcing anti-
discrimination norms in the workplace. The EEOC must coordinate the 
work of scores of attorneys across the country to advance a common goal, 
and it utilizes several levers to direct their activities. For example, it 
distributes a Compliance Manual with sample decrees, and draft decrees 
are reviewed at the regional level and, for decrees with over twenty 
benefitted parties, at the national level as well. As a result, as EEOC 
regional attorney John Hendrickson says, “The consent decrees look 
awfully cookie cutter, and they are.”274  
 
 
 272. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the Supreme Court held that in cases that did not involve a tangible 
employment action such as demotion or firing, an employer can assert an affirmative defense to 
liability for sexual harassment when it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior” and “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer”. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765. It then 
suggested that the affirmative defense is more likely available to an employer that had promulgated an 
anti-harassment policy and provided a complaint procedure. Id. 
 273. Walter Connolly, Jr., the attorney who represented Mitsubishi in the class action suit against 
it, made this comment in an interview following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Faragher and 
Ellerth. DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 214 (citing Jane Daugherty, 
Racial Discrimination Charges Rise in Michigan, DETROIT NEWS, July 15, 1998).  
 274. Interview with John Hendrickson, supra note 123. 
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CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE EEOC’S SYSTEMIC EFFORTS 
This Article’s project is positive, not normative. Nevertheless, we 
briefly consider in conclusion how our examination of the nature of the 
EEOC’s injunctive practice bears on various normative claims in the 
literature. 
Our study of the EEOC’s systemic cases suggests that the consent 
decrees it obtains primarily implement managerialist remedies—the 
policies and structures considered “best practices” by many firms and 
human resources professionals. If this depiction is accurate, is it a 
problem? A number of scholars have been highly critical of the legal 
profession’s embrace of managerialist responses, and their criticism would 
likely extend to the EEOC practices we document as well. Bagenstos, for 
example, concludes that “there is scant evidence that the responses urged 
[by lawyers and consultants] actually result in equal treatment or unbiased 
decisionmaking.”275 Similarly, Selmi describes these types of remedies as 
“cosmetic in nature” and “primarily designed to address public relations 
problems,”276 while Bisom-Rapp dismisses training programs as 
“symbolic gestures” whose efficacy has little empirical support.277 
Scholars are correct to point out that, for many standard managerialist 
remedies, there is a disturbing lack of empirical evidence of their 
effectiveness in redressing or preventing discrimination.
278
 In particular, 
the heavy emphasis on EEO and sexual harassment training in the courts 
and by the legal profession is troubling. Studies do not support the claim 
that these programs can change employee attitudes; indeed, evidence 
suggests that if poorly conducted, they can produce backlash harmful to 
women and minority employees.
279
 In light of these concerns, the 
frequency with which the EEOC negotiates training as a court-enforceable 
remedy raises questions about the effectiveness of its efforts to secure 
relief for victims of discrimination.  
We agree wholeheartedly that more empirical evidence is needed, 
rather than assuming that a practice is effective just because it is widely 
accepted. But it seems likely that some managerialist responses are, 
 
 
 275. Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 20, at 29. 
 276. Selmi, The Price of Discrimination, supra note 26, at 1250. 
 277. Bisom-Rapp, Ounce of Prevention, supra note 77, at 6, 29. 
 278. See DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 21. 
 279. See generally Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, Best Practices, supra note 76 (diversity training has 
negative effect); Dobbin & Kalev, Origins, supra note 256 (summarizing literature); Bisom-Rapp, 
Ounce of Prevention, supra note 77 (summarizing studies). 
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indeed, useful.
280
 In particular, bureaucratic controls may help constrain 
decisionmaking in ways that reduce the influence of stereotypes and 
implicit biases. For example, sociologists have concluded that 
“[f]ormalized practices or formal structures such as a personnel or human 
resources department reduce the use of sex and race as hiring criteria by 
limiting decision makers’ discretion,” whereas “[s]ubjective hiring 
procedures and vague criteria free decision makers to favor persons of 
their own race or sex.”281 Similarly, Kalev et al. found evidence that 
practices that assign organizational responsibility for change—e.g., 
affirmative action plans, diversity committees, diversity managers—are 
effective in increasing the proportion of women and minorities in 
management.
282
 Thus, any assessment of the EEOC’s injunctive practices 
ought to focus on whether a particular managerialist response is actually 
helpful or not. The fact that some of the remedies pursued by the EEOC 
are likely ineffective does not mean that all bureaucratic responses are 
problematic.  
In addition, even if other settlement terms might be more effective in 
any given case, evaluating the EEOC’s approach needs to consider the 
Commission’s docket as a whole, not case by case. Perhaps the EEOC 
would have been more effective at promoting equal employment 
opportunity in a particular case if it pursued a more muscular kind of 
litigation—with more aggressive claims for higher damages, more 
intrusive remedies, longer enforcement periods, and more onerous decree 
termination provisions. But it is important to remember that the EEOC 
operates under constraints. Gladiator litigation requires lots of time and 
effort, and true collaboration is also highly resource-intensive. A relatively 
easy-to-apply, bureaucratic approach to injunctive remedies allows the 
agency to bring—and resolve—more lawsuits.  
Sociologists have noted that the process of “managerialization of law” 
is an ambiguous one. On the one hand, it “has the potential to undermine 
 
 
 280. See generally Dobbin & Kalev, Origins, supra note 256 (reviewing the literature); Kalev, 
Dobbin & Kelly, Best Practices, supra note 76 (finding mixed effects). 
 281. Barbara F. Reskin, Debra B. McBrier & Julie A. Kmec, The Determinants and Consequences 
of Workplace Sex and Race Composition, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 335, 343–44 (1999). 
 282. See Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, Best Practices, supra note 76, at 590. Similarly, bureaucratic 
oversight that imposes accountability has been found to increase the effectiveness of organizational 
practices intended to increase diversity. See Frank Dobbin, Daniel Schrage, & Alexandra Kalev, 
Someone to Watch Over Me: Coupling, Decoupling, and Unintended Consequences in Corporate 
Equal Opportunity (Working Paper), available at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~dobbin/cv/working 
papers/Someone_to_Watch_Over_Me.pdf. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1588 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:1519 
 
 
 
 
legal ideals.”283 Grievance processes, for example, “tend to recast 
grievances in ways that downplay legal issues and that focus instead on 
more typically managerial concerns . . .; disputes that originate as rights 
violations . . . are likely to be handled as interpersonal difficulties, 
administrative problems, or psychological pathologies.”284 On the other 
hand, as the law is reframed “in ways that make it appear more consistent 
with traditional managerial prerogatives,” they are more easily internalized 
by organizations.
285
 When the personnel profession recasts civil rights 
imperatives as initiatives that are good for business, it promotes the 
internalization of these legal norms, albeit in an altered form. Similarly, it 
may be rational for the EEOC to pursue familiar bureaucratic practices in 
the Commission’s consent decrees. The EEOC’s systemic cases we 
examined were overwhelmingly settlements, and the agency needed some 
level of employer buy-in to resolve them short of full-blown litigation. 
The EEOC’s ability to resolve cases may be enhanced when it pursues 
remedies that have the aura of being good for business. For the employer 
faced with ongoing litigation, it must be easier to accept a settlement that 
entails the adoption of practices already followed in many leading 
organizations. 
Moreover, the EEOC’s practices can have impact even beyond its 
docket by influencing employer practice. If the remedies the EEOC 
pursues suggest “best practices,” employers seeking to avoid lawsuits can 
emulate those practices long before they face any concrete threat of suit. In 
this way, bureaucratic solutions to civil rights problems may magnify the 
EEOC’s influence by providing employers with a road map for 
compliance. If more onerous terms were demanded, employers might opt 
not to comply until forced through litigation. On net, whether the agency 
would be more effective by forcing more radical change on fewer 
employers than by litigating—and settling—more cases on standardized 
terms depends on the effectiveness of the standard remedies.  
Finally, the EEOC operates under political and legal constraints. 
Congress establishes the Commission’s budget and exercises oversight 
authority. If the agency pursues a reform agenda more aggressive than that 
preferred by key political leaders, it risks being reined in by Congress. 
According to former EEOC Commissioner Paul Steven Miller, “Congress 
 
 
 283. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric, supra note 22, at 1592. 
 284. Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on 
the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 941, 967 (1999). 
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. . . sees us as an agency which is there to manage employment 
discrimination disputes,”286 rather than to prevent or remedy 
discrimination. If, in fact, Congress has such a limited view of the 
Commission’s role, a strategy of settling many cases on standardized 
terms rather than vigorously pursuing a handful of transformative cases 
may make sense. Legal doctrine also cabins the EEOC’s ability to pursue 
structural reform. If the injunctive relief it pursues is less robust than it 
could be, the problem may stem as much, or more, from the courts’ 
evolving doctrine as from a lack of commitment on the part of the EEOC. 
As Bagenstos has pointed out, claims about what types of employer 
conduct are wrongful and should be prevented are deeply controversial.
287
 
Judges have been increasingly reluctant to embrace a more expansive 
definition of discrimination—one that holds employers accountable for 
structural disadvantage and not merely intentional forms of invidious 
discrimination.
288
 And as the courts’ conception of what constitutes 
discrimination has contracted, so too has the remedial ambition of 
structural reform cases. Consent decrees, after all, are negotiated 
settlements reached in the shadow of the law. As a result, the EEOC’s 
ability to pursue more aggressive structural remedies has diminished. 
Whether or not the EEOC’s injunctive practices we observed in our study 
period were optimal in the sense of being maximally effective in 
combating workplace discrimination, they were an understandable 
response to the various constraints under which the agency operated.
289
 
Indeed, under a more individualized, fault-based understanding of 
discrimination, the EEOC might find it difficult to pursue even rather 
routine managerialist remedies.
290
  
 
 
 286. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 551. 
 287. See Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 20, at 36–40. 
 288. Id. at 39, 41–44.  
 289. Scholars have proposed a number of reforms intended to boost the agency’s effectiveness in 
combating workplace discrimination. See, e.g., Green, Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 
supra note 3 (arguing for enhanced role for EEOC); Selmi, Price of Discrimination, supra note 26 
(suggesting that the EEOC play a more active role in overseeing implementation of consent decrees in 
private class actions); Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 18, at 566 (calling for the EEOC to play a 
larger role in pooling information and building networks for effective problem-solving); David 
Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 695–711 (2013) 
(proposing that the EEOC be granted sweeping gatekeeping powers over all class actions and systemic 
job discrimination suits). Evaluating these proposals is beyond the scope of this Article. However, our 
study suggests caution. Giving the Commission an expanded role in private class actions is unlikely to 
prove transformative of its practices, unless the political, legal, and resource realities that shape the 
EEOC’s activities are also significantly changed. 
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In any event, to repeat, our project is positive not normative. This 
Article has looked at the EEOC’s litigation but not at what happens at the 
regulated workplaces. We do not here assess either the problems the 
EEOC sought to solve or the Commission’s success or failure in that 
endeavor. And the positive point is this: Existing visions of structural 
reform litigation are altogether too romantic. The EEOC’s injunctive cases 
demonstrate neither contests to the death, nor collaborative love-fests; 
instead, they provide evidence that the managerialism so evident in non-
litigation responses to EEO imperatives is evident, as well, in the EEOC’s 
large and influential component of the civil rights docket.  
 
 
implicitly rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to impose more rational personnel practices on the company. 
Although the decision concerned the technical requirements of Rule 23, the tone of the majority 
opinion suggests deep skepticism about any claim of discrimination not founded in demonstrable 
animus. In denying class certification, the Court in effect rejected the plaintiff’s theory that Wal-
Mart’s organizational structures systematically disadvantaged women because of its failure to establish 
any criteria for pay and promotion decision, or to post available management jobs. If the Court were to 
move substantive doctrine toward requiring proof of specific discriminatory intent by a culpable actor, 
that would weaken the ability of the EEOC to push even the standardizing bureaucratic responses we 
document. 
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